

ROUTLEDGE RESEARCH ON TAIWAN

Language, Politics and Identity in Taiwan

Naming China

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CHAPTER II Communist Bandits (*Gongfei*, 共匪)—the Evil Enemy

Like a spirit that cannot be exorcised, *gongfei* (Communist bandits) has stayed with Taiwan since the Nationalists moved there in 1949, though its subtext has gone from deadly serious, to nostalgically reflective, to mischievous (whether to achieve practical ends or serve as sarcasm). The emotional slogan, "Extinguish the All-Evil Communist Bandits and Rescue Mainland Fellows from the Same Womb!" (*xiaomie wane gongfei, jiejiu dalu tongbao*), so mobilized the nation that children chanted it well into the 1980s. Thirty years on, "*gongfei*" elicits varied voices—regret, pity, anger, playfulness, pragmatism—as it indexes the "not-so-good old days." The evolution of *gongfei*'s semantics and relocation of its discursive sites indexes ROC's move from being against the CCP to becoming a more friendly, albeit at times ambivalent, connection on multiple fronts.

Officially implemented two years before Chiang's arrival in Taiwan, these bandit-related phrases permeate discursive sites, traversing historical trajectories as dominant names for China for almost forty years. For most local Taiwan residents, *gongfei* provided one of the first contacts with the remote, barely-known Chinese Communists. Having just rid themselves of Japanese colonizers, local residents eagerly awaited the "motherland" government, which brought with it *gongfei* as the enemy's name. Through legal codes; official speeches; print propaganda; broadcast media and artifacts; and ceremonies and performances in all parts of society, mobilizing state efforts as well as private citizens to fight and guard against *gongfei*, that period saw invocation of a familiar hero-villain script to frame the CCP as a savage-faced ferocious enemy to be exterminated at all costs.

Growing from the character *fei*, and proliferating to form extensive metaphorical clusters (Jamieson, 1992), *gongfei* excoriates the CCP as malicious and irredeemable, providing grounds to question its right to rule the mainland. Such images contrasted with images promoted by the Nationalists, exiled in Taiwan, of themselves as humane and righteous, legitimizing their "sacred" mission to reclaim the *gongfei*-occupied Chinese mainland and rescue its people. This concocted position dovetailed with United States policy on containing communism, based in part on enmity with the Soviet Union; in the West Pacific, this thinking ran, a line of protection could be formed among South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore, based on their more or less democratic—or at least non-Communist—governments.

With the Nationalists' full attention on *gongfei*, Taiwan became a "recovering base" placed under martial law to better carry out the reclaiming mission. So powerfully entrenched was *gongfei* that it survived, indeed may even have been strengthened, in the face of the overwhelming rejection Chiang must have felt when ROC's United Nations seat was taken by the PRC in 1972. In line with the new national policy of "Unifying China by the Three Principles of the People"¹ (*sanminzhuyi tongyi zhongguo*), the intervening years saw *gongfei* traverse an unsteady path as its veneer was gradually, albeit inconsistently, dissolved until officially banned in 1992 via a new naming policy, following Taiwan's democratization. This preoccupation was appropriately

summarized by Yang Yi-rong (1991) who described Taiwan's policy toward the mainland as involving language, games, and dreams that were frankly naïve and fatuous.

Continuing its grasp on Taiwanese consciousness, since the late 1980s *gongfei* has stolen back into Taiwan discourse wearing various disguises. Newspaper columns contain personal memoirs about political paranoia in times past; Chen Mao-xiong (2005a) recalls, "In the 1960s the KMT prohibited Taiwanese from listening to '*gongfei*'s' broadcasts..." That was a time most Taiwanese born before the 1970s recall vividly, dominated by images of the bloody *gongfei* and the suffering mainland compatriots. The once-taboo *gongfei* has also been invoked as a convenient term for targets for commercial profit or political contributions. In 2010, when Taiwan's delegation vehemently rejected China's demand that Taiwan present itself as "Chinese Taipei" instead of "Taiwan" at the opening ceremony of the Tokyo International Film Festival, meaning that Taiwanese representatives could not walk with other celebrities on the red carpet, the *Liberty Times* editorial was titled, "The Ugly Face of *Gongfei* Appears Again" ("Ugly Face," 2010).

This chapter tracks how *fei*'s meanings proscribe unique postures toward which Taiwan must continually adapt, aided by the resilience of the Chinese language in building strings of words, solidifying *gongfei*'s essence while permitting its expansion. Taiwan has been less a primary player than a springboard to a much more extensive project, through which an imagined overarching Sinic world might be perfected. At each turn, *gongfei*'s meanings have been revised, altered, even rejuvenated, all growing from the original root describing an evil enemy to be destroyed at all costs.

We first explore historical narratives showing how *gongfei* began as a tool of Nationalist propaganda in China in the late 1920s to be revived in Taiwan mainly during the rule of Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo. We then discuss how *gongfei* has waned, become dormant, and eventually gone from official discourse in the late 1980s, only to resume roughly in the last decade as a nostalgic reference. Emerging contemporaneously was use of *gongfei* by the DPP and other supporters of Taiwan's independence, publicly mocking KMT's increasing overtures toward the CCP, especially after KMT's return to power in 2008. *Gongfei*'s evolution foregrounds multifaceted and complex issues relating to the struggle of Taiwan to define its identity and ethnicity—its "Chineseness"—in the face of CCP's steadily growing world influence.

Fighting Against Evil: Official Policies and Their Implementation

The evolution of *fei* to *gongfei* shows how names metamorphose in response to political exigencies. *Fei* has been part of Chinese discourse for some time. Thanks to character combinations in Chinese, its more mundane manifestations have changed, into a name inextricably connected to communism (*gong*, short for *gongchandang*): *gongfei*. So powerfully entrenched is *gongfei* that, for many, *fei* is no longer a term for all kinds of banditry, but exclusively *Communist* banditry.

It is particularly worth noting that *fei* is written 匪, a character that combines the sound of *fei* (非), "not" or "negation," surrounded by the Chinese radical *xi* (匚), enclosure. Perceiving the propaganda message, the character 匪 allows readers to see and feel the CCP as bandits "hiding" and "negating" what the ROC government advocates. As *gong* has altered and merged with *fei*, *fei* has become shorthand for *gongfei* and is often used without *gong*, while *gong* has gained well-nigh exclusive rights to modify *fei*. Yet each character has traversed complicated historical routes before intersecting and merging—to name China in 1947 and 1957, *gongfei* was sanctioned through official discourse and promulgated by government policies, interspersed with other declarations.

At the turn of the twentieth century, with the Qing dynasty disintegrating in the wake of the Wuchang Uprising, the Republic of China (established in 1912 by the Nationalists) remained chaotic, with marauding warlords and armed rebel factions—*fei*—controlling different territories. The warlord-based Beiyang government was established in 1912, and though recognized as legitimate, was conquered by the Northern Expedition led by Chiang Kai-shek, which finally unified China (1926-1928). During this chaotic period, it was common for armed rebel groups to excoriate each other as *feijun* (bandit troops; *jun*, troop); each group, to highlight its legitimacy, castigated the others as *fei* ("Communist Bandits," 2013)².

The evolution of *gong* was even more tortuous, as it encapsulated approximately one hundred years' ambivalent relationship between the KMT and the CCP. In the early 1920s, CCP members, encouraged by the Soviet Union, joined KMT to help spread communism within its ranks. KMT's acceptance of this was likely due to their need for help by the Soviet Union. The first KMT/CCP alliance—named *guogong* cooperation, *guo* for *guomindang* [KMT] and *gong* for *gongchandang*—came in 1923 with the formation of the National Revolutionary Army. While pursuing the Northern Expedition, Chiang Kai-shek purged the CCP from KMT's ranks in 1927. Mao Zedong and Zhu De broke from the Nationalists in the Nanchang Uprising of 1927 and established the China Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army, which in 1928 became the Red Army³. These events led to the Chinese Civil War, lasting until 1936, during which the KMT attempted several encirclement campaigns (1930 to 1934) to drive out the CCP.

From KMT's early acceptance of CCP members into KMT; to Chiang's purging of the CCP and the resulting break with KMT; to nearly ten years of civil war; to cooperation again; and finally to civil war again, the relation between KMT and CCP has proven wildly variable and complicated. Both contested for the right to rule China during a frenzied, disordered time, while occasionally cooperating, all under the threat and actuality of foreign invasion. More than a partner, the KMT-led Nationalist government had to work with the vicious and vulgar *fei*, who endorsed the unflattering *gong* ideology. As the CCP's power grew, and as China faced threats from Japan, note

how Chiang refers to the CCP as *chifei*, "red bandit" (*chi*, intense red) and its forces as *feijun* ("Communist Bandits," 2013) in a 1931 speech advocating internal peace in China:

My fellow countrymen, at this time when the *chifei* and those betrayed warlords who join forces with the imperialists...we should strive for peace within before fighting against the outside... If we don't first eliminate the *chifei* and restore the vigor of the nation, then we won't be able to fight against [outside] attacks.

Chiang Kai-shek's diary during this period testifies to his intense feelings about the CCP, that it must be eradicated to save China⁴. Although the Red Army was called *hongjun* (*hong*, red), red symbolizing socialism/communism and workers' movements, *chi* is more intense, so combining *chi* and *fei* conveyed a view of the CCP's intense Communist banditry. The war between KMT and CCP continued until the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, leading to the second period of *guogong* cooperation. World War II ended in 1945 with the surrender of Japan, precipitating renewed hostilities between KMT and CCP and re-igniting the civil war.

During these times language became KMT's preferred tool to frame perceptions of the CCP. Among all *fei* or warlords, *gong* could be identified as the most important, eventually becoming *the* enemy that "stole" China. *Gong* and *fei* were merged into one powerful phrase, *gongfei*, Communist bandit. Alternative names such as *jianfei* (sly bandits; *jian*, sly); *gongjun* (Communist army); and so on, proliferated, centered about "evil Communist banditry."

On July 4, 1947, the State Council passed the "Program on Rigorously Enforcing National Mobilization for the Annihilation of *Gongfei* Insurgency." Ten months before Chiang became the first ROC president under the newly installed ROC Constitution, and two years before coming to Taiwan, the Nationalist government issued a formal policy (Document No. 0744) on July 15, 1947, to "rectify names" (*zhengming*):

The government is now working hard to exterminate the rebellion of the Communists throughout the country. To rectify their name...from now on all documents and newspapers, whether internal or external, should address [them] as "*gongfei*." To avoid confusion, there should be no more use of such names as *jianfei* or *gongjun*.

The policy centralized the integration of *gong* and *fei*—what ROC was fighting is *fei* and what marks their banditry as more evil is its nature, *gong*. Only when both characters are used could CCP's essence be properly apprehended.

The Executive Yuan followed with a detailed listing of governmental units to be notified of the policy (Document No. 29038, issued 1947, July 23). Attached was a detailed explanation

concerning how *fei* and related expressions should be used. First, for Communist party leaders and members, *fei* would be added after their last names, which in Chinese occur first (Mao Zedong becomes "Mao *fei* Zedong"). Second, titles of Communist organizations and units would be preceded with "*wei*" (fake) or "*suowei de*" (so-called) before quotation marks, or in quotation marks alone. CCP's national budget would be described as "*guojia yusuan*" (national budgets) and a state-owned organization as "*zhonggong 'guoying' danwei*" ("Chinese Communist 'state-owned' unit"). Aligning with the *fei* banditry image, such practices aimed to characterize CCP as usurpers, their policies and units illegitimate.⁵ By unifying CCP under *gongfei* and specifying additional steps to ensure implementation, the government actualized a complete meaning system for *gongfei*.

Exceptions had to be approved, as in the case of the Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, which asked to continue using previous names (Document No. 28647, issued on August 18, 1947):

Concerning the case of transferring rescue products and materials...to avoid provocation and for the sake of facilitating business, regarding the communication and documents concerning the exchange of products and materials between this Administration and the representatives of the Communist region, between this Administration and its affiliated organizations in the Communist region, and between [this Administration] and the United Center, could we please use the original names? It is hoped that the request will be granted.

This request was made to the Executive Yuan, which forwarded it to the Central Government (Document No. 34283, issued on August 28, 1947), and the request was finally granted (Document No. 0872, issued on August 30, 1947). Unsuitable as the derogatory "bandit" may have seemed, the matter was handled officially through layers of administrative process. As we will see, this 1947 policy was followed by another call for "rectification of names" for the CCP policy in 1952, and a more formal policy in 1957, reinforcing *gongfei* as the dominant, officially endorsed, basis for discourse.

The Nationalists called naming the CCP a "rectification of names"—a cultural ideal from Confucius—lending the process a patina of cultural and historical authenticity; it was not just political language, but an ethical concern. Aligning language with perceptions about communism appeals to cultural traditions about the moral correspondence between name and substance, bestowing order in turbulent times. Such naming practices stabilize a government-sponsored core of political meaning, in which what is changed is not just the name, but a unified position and posture toward Chinese Communists.

Depicting ROC as confronting vicious *gongfei* helped legitimize the transition from the *ROC Constitution* to the *Temporary Provisions* implemented in 1948⁶. The *ROC Constitution* was

passed on January 1 and enacted on December 25, 1947, a milestone making ROC the first democratic country ever established by Chinese. The new constitutional freedoms, however, were soon restricted, as *Temporary Provisions* authorized the president to declare martial law in specific territories, due to "insurgence" (*panluan*) of the Communists, or more precisely, "insurgence" of *gongfei*. With *gongfei* continuing to be an "insurgent group," *Temporary Provisions*, which originally had a time limit of two years, was extended indefinitely until *gongfei* could be defeated (Roy, 2003, p. 84).

Here the phrase *panluan*—especially *luan*, disorder—serves an important political function. With *disorder* contrasted sharply with order and righteousness (*zheng*), ROC's mission is, in Chinese four-character set idiom (*chengyu*), *boluan fanzheng* (reverse disorder and return to order; *bo*, turn around or poke; *fan*, return). Note how *gongfei*-inspired *luan* is aberrant, an exceptional situation that will "return" to order only with measures undertaken by *zheng*, or the ROC government. Restricting constitutional freedoms to fortify ROC's ability to fight the wicked *gongfei* was a small price to pay for the grander goal, conveniently framing self-other positioning as needing martial law for a temporary check, and effectively setting aside the *ROC Constitution*.

Interestingly, the first command to enforce martial law was in 1948 and did not apply to "Taiwan Province," which came under martial law later in 1949, six months before the ROC government arrived. As *gongfei* held the mainland and ROC exiled in Taiwan called itself "Free China," Taiwan became the "springboard" (*tiaoban*) to the mainland and became treated as "a region under martial law." Along with *Temporary Provisions* that froze the constitution, the Nationalist government enacted legal codes to buttress the banditry images. These included the *Punishing and Handling Insurgency Bill* in 1949 and the *Inspect and Eliminate Feidie Bill* (*feidie*, bandit spies) in 1950 (both abolished in 1991), severely punishing people found allied with or working for *gongfei*, ushering in the era of "white terror." Aligned with the *gongfei* metaphor, these codes consistently designate CCP as an insurgent *fei* against whom the most active measures had to be taken.

These edicts were followed by lower level administrative orders, especially those encouraging people to report on *feidie* and calling on *feidie* to surrender themselves. Examples include *Policy on Delivering Oneself by Gongfei and People Associated with Fei*, and *Policy on Reporting Feidie Incentives*, implemented by the Defense Department in 1951. Subsequently, additional policies and incentives were offered by what was then the Taiwan Provincial Government and the Executive Yuan (Li Xiao-feng, 2009). *Gongfei* not only validated Nationalist claims over the mainland, it legitimized authoritarian rule.

Moreover, with *gongfei* fortifying its position through alliance with Russia—both were branded "traitors to the Han" (*hanjian*) and hence "traitorous groups"—there was more grist for charges about its evil nature. In 1952, Chiang promoted national mobilization for anti-Communism and fighting Russia, and also published *Basic Theory on Anti-communism and Fighting Russia*

(*fangong kange jibenlun* [*fan*, against, *kang*, resist and rebel, *e*, Russia; fight against Communists and Russia; *jibenlun*, basic theory]). Exacerbated by the ethnic (and ethnocentric) spirit of the popular slogan, "Han people and thieves do not stand on the same ground" (*hanzeibuliangli*), the respectable "Han" and the traitors/bandits were seen as living in two different worlds—virtuous versus evil; hopeful versus desolate; kind versus cruel. This line of rhetoric continued even after the Soviet Union largely left the situation.

Calling CCP *gongfei* was never a strategy on its own; rather, it incessantly occupied the Nationalist government's attention in managing its identity project by implementing multiple naming policies stimulated in the anti-Communist era. In 1952, KMT's Central Reform Committee proposed a policy to unify propaganda phrases and names for the mainland (對大陸宣傳名詞稱謂統一規定表), articulating rules in six categories: geographical location in the mainland; foreign Communist countries; institutions, societies, and associations on the mainland; activities and events on the mainland; key figures and model people; and Communist International and related organizations. The reason for such standardization, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Document Number 3669) was,

Our propaganda phrases and names for the mainland have not been consistent, thus negatively impacting the effects of propaganda. Hence, we construct this comprehensive policy on unifying propaganda phrases and names for the mainland, for the reference of all units.

Continuing to abide by the *fei* metaphor, the policy endorsed the same practices as before, such as adding *fei* after the last names of Communists; using *fei* to modify Communist entities; putting an organization or event in quotation marks; adding "fake" or "so-called" to titles of Communist organizations and units *and* putting the name in quotation marks; describing something as "under control of *gongfei*" or "manipulated by the *fei* party"; and so on.

Particularly interesting, though, is what extends previous policy, as in the category concerning key figures and model people, particularly regarding Mao Zedong and the Russians. For example,

Stalin: Call his name directly. If necessary, add some scolding phrases such as, "Red Tsar," "Devil of Invasion," or abbreviate it as "Devil Shi."

Key people in the People's Republic: Use original terms but add downgrading phrases if needed.

Mao Zedong: Call [him] Mao bandit Zedong or Han traitor Mao Zedong. If necessary, add scolding adjectives such as "Russian lackey."

The pervasiveness of this practice was borne on the tide of cold war animosities between Communists (*gong*) and anti-Communists (*fangong*; *fan*, anti-), with ROC and the United States signing the Sino-US Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954. To be in line with the United States

containment policy, the ROC embarked on an array of measures describing the mainland as unfortunately "occupied" by insurgent *gongfei*, who were "traitors to the Han."

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on July 26, 1957 the Executive Yuan again ordered the Ministry to rectify names for the CCP (Document number 4107):

To set the record straight, on July 5 of this year, the President [Chiang Kai-shek] instructs us that "when giving speeches or talking in public areas, [one] should not call [them] the Communist Party (*gongchandang*), but should address [them] as the party of bandits (*feidang*) or gang of bandits of Zhu and Mao (*zhumao feibang*)."

Concerning this order, the Ministry informed all foreign ROC embassies to follow instructions (Document number 01032). Similar orders were no doubt given to other governmental units.

These instructions were formalized, as the Executive Yuan implemented another policy on August 19, 1957, rectifying names for China: *Main Points on Unifying Names for Zhu and Mao Gongfei and Other Relevant Terms* (統一對朱毛共匪及有關名稱要點) (Central Document Number 235). The policy expands the 1947 policy, and treats *fei* as the central organizing theme in these naming practices. Here are a few examples: (1) ordinarily called "Zhu and Mao *gongfei*," these can be abbreviated as "Zhu and Mao" and "*gongfei*"; (2) the entire name for the *fei* party is "Zhu and Mao Party of Bandits," abbreviated as "Party of Bandits (*feidang*)"; (3) the whole name for the *fei* army is "Zhu and Mao Army of Bandits," abbreviated as "Army of Bandits (*feijun*)"; (4) the whole name for the *fei* regime is "Zhu and Mao's fake and bandit organization," abbreviated as "fake and bandit organization (*fei wei zuzhi*)"; and so on. Similar rules apply to "Zhu and Mao's bandit cadre (*feigan*)"; "Zhu and Mao's bandit spies (*feidie*)"; and even "Zhu and Mao's bandit goods (*feipin*)"—all "Zhu and Mao" could be omitted, leaving the *fei*-descriptive term to function as a center of its own.

These practices are comprehensive, covering all possibilities, with exceptions to *fei* referenced in the notes. In note #1, "Overseas Chinese newspapers, due to their special circumstances, may use names such as CCP, the Chinese Communists, Communist Army, [and] Chinese Communist regime"; also, "Russian robbers may be called Russian imperialists, and the agreement between *fei* and the Russians can be called an agreement between Mao and the Russians." Obviously, the government recognized that its rhetoric might not be accepted in other contexts. In translating quoted foreign messages, original terms could be used, but indirect reporting of foreign messages should still follow the policy (note #3). Special rules were to be implemented for naming *gongfei* and relevant parties when broadcasting and propagandizing in the direction of the mainland (note #2) and for translating Chinese into English (note #4). The *fei*-centered metaphor dwells in legal discourse and orders, and sustains an officially sanctioned view supported by international politics, having remained entrenched and influential for about four decades.

Bandit Prevails: Forty Years in Development

When the state machine seemingly permeated every domain in Taiwanese life, *gongfei* became center of a metaphor cluster through its consistent and vigorous use on various discursive sites. *Gongfei* reached prominence during the 1960s, abated somewhat in the 1970s, and almost faded into oblivion in the 1980s before martial law was lifted. The ebb and flow in manifestations of the name over approximately forty years can be seen in newspapers. In the *United Daily News*, for example, *gongfei* appeared in 13,365 articles during the 1950s; 16,221 articles during the 1960s; 11,515 during the 1970s; then suddenly dropped to 1,625 during the 1980s; going further down to 272 during the 1990s. Between January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2009, *gongfei* appears only 221 times, and for the next four years (January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2013), a scant 61 times⁷. Not only does the number of references shrink, their substance transforms significantly.⁸ The pervasive advocacy of *gongfei* stayed in line with the stern anti-Communist posture until around the 1980s, when that stance was abandoned by many countries—including the ROC—and *gongfei* finally faded into the background to blend with Taiwan's nascent democracy.

Converging Words for a Fei-Centered Metaphor Cluster

During its ascendancy, thanks to the structure of the Chinese language, *fei*'s expressions expanded and drew to them words bearing similar contents, forming a clearly branched, well-developed configuration of names highlighting banditry. Successive editions of the *ROC Yearbook*—one of the government's official narratives—provide a comprehensive distillation of the policy on rectifying names implemented in 1947. Prior to 1987, the *Yearbook* referred to the CCP as *gongfei*, simply *fei*, or *feidang* (party of bandits).

Fei was also consistently added to the names of CCP members. Mao was named as "chief Mao" (*mao qiu*) or "thief Mao" (*mao zei*), and other leaders identified as "chiefs of brigands" (*zhaizhu*). *Gongfei* were thus "brigands or local or vulgar bandits" (*tufei*), or more precisely, "Communist bandits" (*gongchan feitu*) or "Chinese Communist bandits" (*zhonggong feitu*). They were said not to be human, but ferocious rascals (*liao*). Naturally, they have no central government, merely a "nest" or "hideout" (*chao*) breeding thieves who must be exterminated (*jiao*) or sabotaged (*dao*) by legitimate governmental authorities such as the ROC.

These "sly bandits" (*jian fei*) "stole" (*qie*) the mainland, now "fallen into the hands [of bad people]" (*lunxian* or *lunwang*), becoming a "region of bandits" (*feiqu*). They practice tyranny through slaughter, enslavement, and cheating, producing a "disaster of bandits" (*fei huo*). As bandit-related expressions expanded from the character *fei*, their net effect was to render the enemy irredeemable, seemingly outside the bounds of humanity and the law. Such images can prove far more persuasive than lengthy statements or explanations.

Fei is not only a noun, but an adjective to modify—hence permeate—the CCP's people, party, and organization. Whether the "party of bandits," "gang of bandits" (*feibang*), or "party of Chinese Communist bandits" (*zhonggong feidang*) and "gang of Chinese Communist bandits" (*zhonggong feibang*), they are controlled by the "chief of the bandits" (*feiqiu*), leading a "cadre of bandits" (*feigan*) through maintaining "armed forces of the bandits" (*feijun*). Even their artillery is called "bandit's artillery" (*feipao*) ("Communist Bandits," 2013) and their manufactured products "bandits' products" (*feihuo*).

Recalling policies implemented in 1947 and reasserted in 1957, *fei* connects to *wei* (fake, counterfeit) to form a composite adjective signifying a "bandits' fake regime"—a *feiwei zhengquan*. In such illegitimate regimes there are fake governmental units, as in *wei duiwai maoyibu* ("fake Foreign Trade Division"); fake official positions, as in *wei waijiao buzhang* ("fake Foreign Minister"); fake official actions or activities, as in *wei xianfa xiuzhengan* ("fake Act of Constitutional Amendments"); and fake codes, laws, or regulations, as in *feiwei xin xianfa caoan* ("bandits' fake Draft of the New Constitution"). *Fei* and *wei*—though often *fei* could be omitted—thus performed symbolic political functions by elaborating and bringing closure to images of illicit Communists.

The term *fei* makes it clear that from Communists, to their organization, to the consequences of their actions, the CCP embraces terror, violence, and cruelty. The mainland was considered a place of horror, danger, and confinement, where people lived in "deep water and fierce fire" (*shuishen huore*), desperately needing rescue, even through extreme measures, such as "killing the pig and pulling its hair" (*shazhu bamao*). In this last provocative utterance comparing animals with bandits, Chinese homophones are used to denigrate the Communist leaders. The leaders' last names are *zhu* and *mao*. *Zhu* shares the same sound as "pigs" (*zhu*), and *mao* has exactly the same character as "hair." Thus, killing the Communist leaders Zhu De and Mao Zedong become killing the pig and pulling its hair—a thorough, cleansing job of killing an animal, ironically performed by the presumably righteous ROC. The animalistic nature of Communist leaders is displayed hand in hand with the bandit image.

Conflation of these widely propagated *gongfei*-related terms offers a coherent set of government-endorsed meanings effectively demonizing Chinese Communists. If not for *gongfei*'s tyranny, there would be no need for "anti-Communism righteous persons" (*fangongyishi*)—defectors from the PRC to the ROC—since, as Guan Ren-jian (2006) argues, *fangongyishi* is witness to *gongfei*'s tyranny. Using these names sets a confrontational tone, depicting an enemy so evil that people in Taiwan, to reclaim the mainland and its culture, must cooperate with those defecting to the ROC.

Until the late 1980s, the ROC in Taiwan was immersed in a *gongfei* mentality. On the official side, *fei*-centered expressions routinely permeated governmental publications; policy announcements; legal codes; and speeches on official and semi-official occasions, such as, among others, New

Year's Day; Double Tenth Day [National Day]; Recovery Day of Taiwan; inaugural ceremonies; National Father Sun Yat-sen's birthday; President Chiang's birthday; national and KMT party meetings; and opening and graduating ceremonies for military and compulsory schools.

Fortified by distinctive features of the Chinese language, this metaphor cluster allows for proliferation of numerous terms, much like chemical elements forming compounds: "A Chinese word...is a mobile unit which acts on, and reacts with, other units in a constant flux" (James Liu, 1962, pp. 46-47). That the Nationalists were forced to retreat to Taiwan to make of the island a "recovering base" to take back the mainland further imbues *gongfei* with considerable rhetorical energy. As the government fixed its gaze on the demonized Chinese Communists, Taiwan's importance tangentially depended on its other: the more ferocious that other, the more Taiwan had to prepare itself for counter-action, and the less it could freely expand. It is from such a constricted position that Taiwan has had to negotiate its identity, following the shifting political tides indexed by the use of *gongfei*.

Alternative Sites for Expression

Beginning in the 1950s, and for more than thirty years, people in Taiwan were indoctrinated into a *gongfei* mentality, aggressively promoted in various publications and newspapers. *Gongfei* was originally associated with Russia, branded "traitors to the Han." In line with official narratives, both the *Central Daily News* and *United Daily News* consistently used "tyranny of the Communist bandits" (*gongfei baozheng*) to describe the Communist regime, a tyrannical dictatorship that "stole the country" (*qieguo*). An article title in the December 20, 1949, *Central Daily News* illustrates the thematic framework: "Tyranny of the *Gongfei* Directed by Imperial Soviet" (*sudi daoyan xia de gongfei baozheng*). Except for reader comments, articles containing *fei*-centered phrases appeared on the paper's first or second page, sites usually reserved for official, important matters concerning the whole nation, reinforcing their status as sanctioned, dominant discourse. Gold (2003, p. 13) notes:

...this system did not grow organically out of issues and concerns within Taiwanese local society. Rather, it was imposed over and inserted by an external quasi-colonial occupying regime...By fiat the outside party-state made its agenda of recovering the mainland and reuniting all of China the common mission of everyone on the island.

In his 1952 New Year's speech, Chiang stated, "We currently are under the invasion of [a] deep red Communist international, which renders the mainland as [the] Imperial Soviet's vassal, and [our] people become the slaves of *gongfei*."⁹ Ancillary organizations reinforced the symbolism. In October 1952, the "China Youth Corps on Anti-Communism and Rescuing the Nation" (中國青年

反共救國團) was established; it was not until 1989 that the characters *fangong* (anti-Communism) were dropped.¹⁰

Articulation of *gongfei* also occurred in National Day speeches (October 10, hence also called "Double Tenth"). Celebrating ROC's founding in 1912, these speeches marked the transition from the Qing dynasty to democracy and were often presented as symbolizing the rise of the Han. In the unsettled time of martial law and suspension of democracy, the president spoke on the nation's behalf; the speeches of Chiang Kai-shek and his successor, Yen Chia-kan, are saturated with *fei*-related expressions. With the mainland controlled by the CCP, National Day speeches reminded citizens of their duty to "rescue and recover the nation" (1953); similarly, Chiang proclaimed, "Our people have been sold out by the sly bandits of Zhu and Mao, our people's rights have also been totally destroyed, and our livelihood has been shattered" (1952). That year also saw an ostentatious military parade to reinforce ROC's commitment to reclaim the mainland (Roy, 2003).

Along with such speeches, written and delivered, were musical renderings, as well as artifacts; inscriptions and symbols on important cultural sites; production and reproduction through mass media channels; and various enacted rituals and performances. In 1953, the government implemented "Methods for Adding Anti-Communist and Fighting Russia Slogan on Printed Materials." Printed material of organizations and individuals, such as calendars, wrapping paper, matchboxes, stationery, movie tickets, commercial advertisements, and even diary notebooks and newspapers/magazines, had to print anti-Communist and fighting-Russia slogans. Police were ordered to "motivate" private organizations and check from time to time to ensure compliance (Zhang Rui-zhen, 2005). The government provided fifty sample slogans using the word *gongfei*, including, "[We will] Fight to Execute Bloody Vengeance against the *Gongfei*"; "Fight against *Gongfei*'s Animalistic Life"; and "Extinguish *Gongfei* and Stabilize the Society."¹¹

Beyond written discourse, people were encouraged through school-sponsored activities such as patriotic song competitions; anti-bandit spies poster competitions; and so on. This top-down national mobilization penetrated all regions of Taiwanese society. Some community/semi-governmental leaders and government officials produced anti-Communist pamphlets to promote anti-Communist spirit. A pamphlet on sanitary education printed by Taoyuan Town Hall in the 1950s reminded people to cultivate the notion, "*Gongfei*'s people's commune is a slave camp," while learning how to exterminate mosquitoes and rats. Taoyuan Agricultural and Irrigation Council also printed, "The Truth about *Gongfei*'s People's Commune," impelling even illiterate farmers to learn "the three oppressions of the people's commune," while celebrating a bumper harvest (Zhang Rui-zhen, 2005).

A 1949 advertisement uses Chinese homophones to promote Alugel: "[To support/enact] anti-Communist and fight Russia, don't drink soda for your stomach problems." The connection? Mao *fei* built his prosperity by inviting Russia in and hurting the Chinese people, just as consumers rely

on soda or other alkaline remedies, which may bestow temporary release but will hurt you more. "Soda" is pronounced *suda*, rhyming with the Chinese pronunciation of "Russia," *sue*. Ye Su-yin (1992) asks whether, with anti-Communist slogans everywhere, "[scaring] consumers not to drink soda randomly by invoking the nation's number one enemies, Russia and *gongfei*, perhaps made good sense and was persuasive to people at that time?" (p. 17).

In a similar spirit, a bakery in Taipei in 1952 named its Moon Festival cakes "anti-communism and fight Russia moon cake" (*fangong kange yuebing*), asking customers to "develop the righteous spirit of the ethnic group"¹² (*fayang minzu zhengqi*) (Yang Hua-kang, 1993, p. 34). A well-known shoe store, during national holidays, used a slogan adopting the style of the Three Character Classic in Taiwan's Recovery Day: "Celebrate the recovery, remember the mainland, extinguish *gongfei*, [and] tidy the land" [*qing guangfu, nian dalu, mie gongfei, zheng heshan*] (Zhang Zi-qiang, 1993). Unsurprisingly, the article is titled, "Even the Advertisement is Patriotic."

Spirit was also fortified through patriotic songs. Fittingly named "anti-Communist songs" (*fangong gequ*), these pieces reinforced themes of anti-communism and opposition to Russia, admonishing that *gongfei* must be eradicated in lyrics such as, "Counterattack, counterattack, counterattack the mainland...the mainland is our territory, our land. Our land, our territory, which cannot be occupied by the Mao thief, [and people] cannot be bullied by Russia bandits" ("Counterattack the Mainland"); "[I] swear I will extinguish *gongfei*, and sing the victory song home" ("I Have a Gun"); and "The tyranny of *gongfei* is devoid of humanity...don't wait to annihilate *gongfei*, let's recover our old territory" ("The Song of *Gongfei*'s Tyranny") (Li Xiao-feng, 2009).

Had *fei* not been uttered in song or speech, it would have been inscribed in writing, as ROC's government underscored aligning culture with revolutionary spirit. Supporting anti-Communist songs was anti-Communist literature. This ignited other movements in literature and culture. Zhang Rui-zhen (2005) noted a 1951 article, "Anti-Communist and fight Russia is the Mandate of Artists"; and in his 1952 New Year's Day speech, Chiang mentioned national mobilization for anti-communism and fighting Russia as in need of reform in four areas: economic, cultural, social, and political. There followed publication of *Basic Theory on Anti-communism and Fighting Russia*, and, in 1953, *Supplement to Government for the People on Education and Music* (民生主義育樂兩篇補述). According to Chiang,

Taiwan province has made significant progress. Ethnic literature¹³ is on the rise, and Taiwanese dramas on anti-Communism and fighting Russia have touched many people. Superior work on anti-communism and fighting Russia has also been produced and performed continuously. But we are not satisfied, because...today as we face tyrannical Russia and *fei gong* trying to systematically destroy my Chinese

culture, there is still too little literary work that would promote ethnic culture in the hearts of people. (p. 245)

Clearly, an important goal of literature is to promote Chinese culture, which to KMT meant fighting against threats from CCP and Russia. Unsurprisingly, after the "Battle Literature" movement was initiated in 1956, the government's policy on literature was firmly established (Huang Yu-lan, 2011). Beyond well-known writers whose work concerned topics, contents, and spirit in line with anti-communism and fighting Russia, even school children learned to write in the proscribed language, with essays/prose often ending with "extinguish all evil *gongfei* and counter-attack the mainland!" Because it did not allow writers to freely express their thoughts, some viewed such anti-Communist literature as having impeded Taiwan's indigenous literature, holding back formation of a Taiwanese identity.

But the inscription took on real, not merely symbolic, implications. Soldiers returning from the Korean War, originally from the mainland but wanting to come to Taiwan, bore tattoos declaring "Kill All *Gongfei*" and "Recover the Mainland," along with some of Chiang's followers¹⁴ (Yang Pei-ling, 1996). The policy's influence on rectification of names was so extensive that governmental publications in the 1970s had to be retroactively modified to reflect its provisions. Reports in the "Weekly on *Gongfei*'s Foreign Relations" were first written in common language, then, prior to finalizing transcripts, edited in red ink to show "proper" usage (inserting "*fei*" after Communist leaders' last names; or adding "bandit" and "fake" [*feiwei*] and quotation marks for CCP units or institutions), rectifying the final product with respect to the name *gongfei*¹⁵.

However, governmental propaganda was often most effective with young people through educational texts. Guan Ren-jian (2006) notes that *gongfei* images started appearing in second grade textbooks, when children's sympathies for suffering *tongbao* were solicited. In the story, "Chase *Gongfei* Away," during a meal a father says, "mainland *tongbao* have no food and no clothes...we should chase *gongfei* away so mainland *tongbao* can eat well and have warm clothes." Third-grade children were directly warned of the terror of *gongfei*. One chapter, "Good People Can't Survive," tells of an old man farming eighty acres and performing charitable acts for his neighbors. On their arrival, *gongfei* held a public meeting accusing the old farmer of exploiting people. People lowered their heads and cried, saying, "This year good people can't survive." The old farmer was forced to become a beggar. In another story, "The Righteous Person Who Defects to Freedom," a righteous anti-Communist (*fangongyishi*) in the Air Force defects to ROC when he finds himself cheated by *gongfei*. A fourth example is, "Paradise Became Hell":

Everyone says Hangzhou is paradise. Since *gongfei* arrived in Hanzhou, they have "purged" and "scuffled." People were killed, or starved to death. After several years, *gongfei* even established "people's communes," treating people like

animals...people worked from day to night, they didn't eat enough and they have no warm clothes. Hanzhou used to be a happy paradise, and now it is a suffering hell.

Accompanying the stories are drawings of *gongfei*, who resemble threatening, fat gangsters with hats, cigarettes, and whips, contrasting with *tongbao*, often bare-chested, pulling carts to plow their fields (Guan Ren-jian, 2006). All stories converge on the deteriorated conditions and suffering of *tongbao*, dwelling on how they were cheated, exploited, and killed. Yang Yi-rong (1994) observed, "1950s textbooks contained many pictures of *gongfei*'s killings, even mass executions pervaded by bodies and blood... Even into the 1980s, elementary school texts had stories describing mainland children constantly living with vermin like roaches and rats." Guan Ren-jian (2006) concludes, "The material tried to teach people to 'hate and resent *fei*,' but it ended up making children 'dread and [feel] terrorized by *fei*.'" One only wonders how powerfully such unflattering images must have penetrated the minds of young readers.

The divide between the two sides was effectively invoked in the rhythmic, two-syllable phrase *fangong* or the then pervasive twelve-character slogan urging people in Taiwan to be united with those in the imagined motherland (*zuguo*):

打倒共產匪徒

dadao gongchan feitu

Defeat the Communist bandits

解救大陸同胞

jiejiu dalu tongbao

Rescue mainland fellows from the same womb

The contrastive framework compelled KMT members to promote Chinese civilization as superior, assuming that losing the mainland was proof of their historical malfeasance. To expiate their guilt, they had to reclaim the mainland, "an immensely consequential project" (Roy, 2003, p. 79) reflecting circumstances needing drastic revision. "KMT as saviors" is set against "CCP as bandits/traitors," promoting the myth of recovery, infusing the mission with a spiritual, quasi-religious character (p. 78).

Though this mythology became increasingly less tenable once China's relations with Russia worsened in the early 1960s, the line of rhetoric continued and even intensified. That the rhetoric actually hardened perhaps reflected Chiang's frustration at his sustained inability (for many reasons) to reclaim the mainland. Nevertheless, the binding of *fei* with Russia continued and lingered. The Yunlin County Government distributed a pamphlet, "Anti-Communism and Fighting Russia Matched Couplets for the Chinese New Year" (*fangong kange chunlian*), providing no fewer than sixty-five examples. The Post Office followed suit: from the 1950s to the 1970s, it reminded people "to go through with the national policy of anti-communism and fighting Russia, don't collect stamps of Russia and *fei*" (Zhang Rui-zhen, 2005).

On the official side, the construction of the Chinese Communists as Russian allies and traitors to the Han was revised to point directly at the CCP, until it became the only target of *fei*. This was

made easier by the flexibility of the Chinese language, and was fortified and strengthened by the calamity of the 1966 Cultural Revolution. The rhetoric was modified from

反共抗俄救同胞

fangong kange jiu tongbao

Anti-communism, fight Russia, and rescue the fellows from the same womb

to

反攻復國救同胞

fangong fuguo jiu tongbao

Counter-attack, recover the nation, and rescue the fellows from the same womb (Cho, 2002, p. 113).

Such revision required minimal effort: replacing "fight Russia" (*kange*) with "recover the nation" (*fuguo*; *fu*, recover, *guo*, nation), there remain seven characters in both the original utterance and the revision, and both continue the theme of counter-attacking *gong*, or *gongfei*.

Thanks to *gongfei*'s "darkness," ROC's "brightness" is highlighted by default, and comparisons between Nationalists as "Han" and the CCP as "traitors to the Han" is depicted as "clear as day and night." From the 1965 National Day speech: "We know our mainland fell into the hands [of bad people] and the *gongfei* won by sheer luck, purely due to their acting as parasites—outwardly they cheat, sew dissension between, and inwardly they seduce, control, pass through, and overthrow..." This speech has 51 *fei*-names, highest of all National Day speeches since 1949. Words describing the CCP became more violent, aggressive, even irrational:

Loyalty, piety, human-heartedness, love, faithfulness, righteousness, amiability, and peace, are the ever-growing, excellent cultural foundation for our Chinese people. The Boxer Rebellion of 1900 and the bandit Mao's tyrannical cruelty, the disobedient revolt of animal nature and evil behavior, are just boils with vermin inside.

(National Day Speech, 1966)

In his 1966 inaugural speech, Chiang described ROC's struggle with Chinese Communists as "exterminating the Communists and sabotaging their nests" (*jiaogong daocho*), calling for "extinguishing this Mao chief of roaming bandits and brigands, [sparing] ourselves the pain of long war!" (National Day Speech, 1967)

Permeating official sites and news reports as the official position of the government, *gongfei* rhetoric likewise intruded in private realms, making the revolutionary spirit a part of everyday life.

Slogans were painted or hung on walls, highways, bridges, streets, and public structures, while radio and television broadcasts often reminded citizens of the "Communist menace." The national anthem preceded every film (Roy, 2003). Everywhere people were reminded to guard against bandit espionage. Slogans such as "reporting on bandit spies is everybody's responsibility" breached every social niche (Li Xiao-feng, 2009), reinforced in the four-character slogan: *baomi fangdie, renren youze* (maintain secrecy and anti-espionage, everyone has the responsibility).

Of course, citizen compliance with such edicts could prove less than ideal. An advertisement for a show featuring scantily clad women had "*baomi fangdie*" on one side, and "*mingge yanwu*" (famous songs and sexy dances) on the other, making of the whole a four-character matched couplet. Similarly, the advertisement for a movie, "No. 7 Female Espionage," had "counter attack the mainland and extinguish *gongfei*" on its right side and "sexy dance between beauty and a big snake will melt your soul and bone" on the left (Zhang Rui-zhen, 2005).

Anti-communism slogans were everywhere. Aside from advertisements, they were in places such as newspaper cartoons; posters; billboards; letters inducting soldiers; covers of stamp sets; and in the text and on inside covers of textbooks. One could find them on matchboxes, movie tickets, covers of train tickets, and even wedding invitations (Li Xia-feng, 2004; Zhang Rui-zhen, 2005). Reporting on the collection of anti-Communist artifacts by Chen Ching-fan, Zhang Rui-zhen (2005) remarks the seeming absurdity in the following terms: "Don't forget to maintain secrecy and anti-espionage when watching scantily clad women on shows, and be sure to beat down *gongfei* on your wedding night!" As the subtitle of a *United Daily News* article (Dong Zhi-shen, 1992) puts it, in an eight-character matched couplet:

吃飯喝水事關反攻	服藥加油不忘大陸
<i>chifan heshui shiguan fangong</i>	<i>fuyao jiayou buwang dalu</i>
Eating and drinking are about counterattack; taking medicine and getting gasoline, never forget the mainland.	

Official positions in various speeches continued to shape anti-Communist expressions, even after the PRC took over ROC's United Nations seat to become the only "legitimate" representative of China in 1971, under UN General Assembly Resolution 2758¹⁶. As the ROC withdrew from the United Nations, Chiang lamented justice thwarted, applying the *fei* theme in an October 26 speech, *To All Compatriots about the Withdrawal of ROC from the United Nations* (中華民國退出聯合國告全國同胞書¹⁷):

The 26th session of the General Assembly violates provisions of the UN Charter by passing the proposal by Albania and other nations who allied with *fei*, making way for the *maogong* [Communist Mao] *feibang* [party of bandits] to steal ROC's seat at the UN and the Security Council. To hold onto our position that Han and thieves do

not stand on the same ground, and also to protect the dignity of the Charter, we announce our withdrawal from the UN...*Maogong feibang* is a insurgent group of the ROC...although the mainland was controlled by *maogong feibang*, the real representative of...mainland people is the ROC government...[it] represents their wish and painful voices, and gives them the greatest courage and hope to fight against the tyranny of *maogong* and strive for human rights and freedom.

In this speech *maogong feibang* appears seven times, with four additional appearances of *fei* in other phrases. These speeches occur in venues surfeit with slogans on posters and banners, such as "firmly against *gongfei*'s entering the United Nations." The *fei*-rhetoric makes the world appear absurd—how could any country choose to align with bandits? Words that might appear more emotional and less rational in private, personal conflicts were paradoxically entwined with dignified official statements and governmental policies, a concocted fusion that seemed justified, given the *daoxing nishi* (*dao*, reverse, *xing*, walk, *ni*, inverse, *shi*, execute)—following paths against humanity—by the CCP.

The seemingly incommensurate qualities of official seriousness and emotional outburst were integrated into expressions describing rescuing people from *fei* as a "sacred mission"—the "mandate of heaven," invoking another Chinese cultural precept—aligning traditional moral teachings with devious political discourse. Such a mission is not just to aid Chinese, but a world where many shortsighted countries abandon their morals to ally with *gongfei*.

When almost all communication came from the government, such rhetoric inculcated feelings of sadness and frustration, inciting patriotism across Taiwan and other offshore islands. On one offshore island *Wuciou* (also *Wuqiu*), the song of the only elementary school had these lyrics:

We are the little friends of the frontier, good students of *Wuciou* elementary school.
We are not afraid of stormy winds and frightening waves; bravely and [with]
perseverance, we advance forward. Our school is erected on the lonely island of the
ocean. We will study hard, and are not afraid of *gongfei* on the opposite shore.
(Zheng Jing-wen, 2011)

In a lonely world, the spirit of fighting against *gongfei* ran high, as the government continued to fortify it through love/military songs. Li Xiao-feng (2009) notes several 1970s popular songs that used classical conditioning in pairing anti-Communist spirit with personal love affairs. An example is "Rhododendron":

Gentle March, Rhododendron blooms on the slope, Rhododendron blooms on the
riverside.

...

Last year the village girl went to the slope; with her boyfriend, they sang songs together, and [she] put a rhododendron in her hair.
This year, the village girl went to the riverside. The Rhododendron has died and bloomed again, and she remembers him on the battlefield.
[She] picks a bright red Rhododendron, facing the conflagration far away, [she says] "[My] brother, when you come back after winning the battle, I will put the Rhododendron on your chest rather than my hair."

Even personal love had to serve the nation to accomplish a "greater me" (*dawo*), settling for a "smaller me" (*xiaowo*), a lesson evoked by the image of a bright red rhododendron. The "conflagration far away," of course, is the *gongfei*-occupied mainland, as reinforced in the following song, "The Willow Branch is Long":

...Sister lowers her head and sews cloth. Why is she busy sewing cloth? Her husband is going to fight the *feidang*. [If he] wears the cloth, [he] will be warm and will have one hundred times the courage to be on the battlefield...kill the Russian thug and extinguish the *feidang*, and come home singing loudly a victory song...

Other titles include, "Who Would not Praise the Hero and the Beauty"; "The Beauty Wants to Marry a Soldier"; and "Marry Her Only if [You] Join the Army" (Li Xiao-feng, 2009). These songs were sung not only by soldiers, but entered into the consciousness of the general public. The Government Information Office required that at least a third of the songs on Taiwan's three television stations be patriotic or artistic songs. In line with the policy, established in the early 1950s, of treating music as a tool to purify the heart and cultivate revolutionary spirit, singers refusing to sing such songs could have their licenses revoked (Li Xiao-feng, 2009). As patriotic songs filled all corners of Taiwan, it is not surprising that, from time to time, middle schools also held inter-campus competitions in singing them, while students also underwent compulsory military education.

Gongfei both frames the other and inscribes the self. From rectification of names to actions endowed by heaven, people in Taiwan were burdened not so much with their immediate fate, but that of remotely connected people on the mainland. ROC's departure from the UN only intensified the burden and dignified the project. In his last National Day speech (and also as evidenced in his diaries for this period) Chiang remains fixated on *gongfei*, portraying "bandits" mired in internal rivalry and self-destruction:

I have pointed out the three necessary stages of the internal fight inside the *Communist bandits*. The first stage is to use the military to purge the party...it uses the power of the *armed bandits* of Lin Biao to purge the power of the *party of bandits* by Liu Shaoqi...The second stage is to move up the thought conflict of the

party of bandits to the level of political power conflict...paralyzing the core of the *party of bandits* and the *fake regime of the bandits*. [1974; emphasis added]

As Taiwan was under martial law, the government controlled all media. In 1976, the *Radio and Television Act* (RTA) was promulgated, stipulating six types of prohibited discourse. Among these, according to Article 21, was that contents should not be "...against the national policy of anti-communism and recovering the nation, or against laws and orders," although one official claimed that since RTA's implementation, the Government Information Office has never used this provision as a basis for punishing television stations (Tang Xiao-min, 2008).

Establishing *gongfei* as the only legitimate way to see the CCP continued in all aspects, with little refuge from the dominant rhetoric. Anti-Communist slogans, whether heard, seen, even touched, permeated every niche of Taiwan's society. Even in foreign magazines, the policy was applied and monitored by official watchdogs. Magazine articles contradicting the Nationalist government's position toward the CCP were removed (R. Barrett, personal communication, October 4, 2011). If they were not, but the article mentioned specific party members or included their photographs, they were stamped with the word "*fei*" (Wei Jian-feng, personal communication, June 28, 2010). Under Rule 11 of *Martial Law*, officers could open mail or telegrams and could even seize or delay them. Government scrutiny of foreign magazine contents to ensure that they too were conforming to *fei*'s correct usage was thus viewed as indispensable.

Gongfei became a completely built-in narrative and cause for everyone, to the extent that there seemed no other way to describe the CCP. Even after Chiang died, the ROC military chanted,

奉行領袖遺志、服從政府領導、消滅萬惡共匪、解救大陸同胞

Fengxing lingxiu yizhi, fucong zhengfu lingdao, xiaomie wane gongfei, jiejiu dalu tongbao

Abide by the dying wish of the leader [Chiang Kai-shek], follow the government's lead, exterminate the all evil *gongfei*, and rescue the mainland fellows from the same womb.

Chiang's successor, Yen Chia-kan, continued to stress the contrast between ROC and PRC in National Day speeches: "Today we will contrast a humane government ruled by the Three Principles of the People of our reclaiming base [Taiwan], and the Communist tyranny of the mainland region of bandits," further asserting that the Nationalist government must "work together to exterminate all-evil Mao bandits, and rescue mainland fellows from the same womb" (1975). Again, in his 1977 speech accounting for China's changing leadership, Yen uses "gang of bandits" (*feibang*) eight times out of a total of twenty-one appearances of the word *fei* to frame the "sacred mission" as destructive purging and cleansing. For both Chiang and Yen, the rhetoric was formulaic, filled with *fei*-centered slogans and repetition. Taking the role of enforcer of justice

against *gongfei*, the Nationalists pursued a mission that became a myth that, while distant, was infused with emotion and patriotism.

Waning, Dormant, and Resurgent: From Official to Unofficial

Although by the early 1960s Chiang Kai-shek had given up his dream of taking back the mainland, propagation of his myth continued until roughly the 1980s, when Taiwan was gradually transformed to a democracy, turning its gaze upon itself. The slow sloughing of the political myth is indexed by the fading of *gongfei*, as it gradually, sporadically, reduced its appearances, while resurging on various discursive sites.

In the official flagship publication *ROC Yearbook*, *gongfei* disappeared around 1985, though using *fei* to name party leaders or government officials had almost entirely vanished some years earlier. As for the character *wei* that preceded official names of organizations, it last appeared in the 1990 edition, although usage was intermittent and less pervasive, compared to its pattern of appearances in earlier *Yearbook* versions. Intriguingly, using quotation marks to designate CCP governmental units as illegitimate continued into the late 1990s. In other words, while *fei*-related terms came to be avoided, punctuational bracketing continued. The government seemingly came to terms with those working for the CCP and via this process less emotional. Still, this altered orientation had to be covered while denying CCP's legitimacy, as articulated in the constitution—hence the continued punctuation marks—until the arrival of an amended constitution and a new policy on rectifying names, demarcating a new era.

Dormancy and Disappearance from Official Discourse

Destabilization of *gongfei* can be traced to Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek's son. Chiang's passing in 1975 brought Yen to the presidency, to be succeeded by Chiang Ching-kuo two years later. While abiding by the *fei* metaphor and its associated marked contrasts, Chiang Ching-kuo curtailed the rhetoric, turning his focus toward Taiwan. Continuing to promote the KMT's cherished goal of building Taiwan as a "model province," he made as new policy, "Unifying China by the Three Principles of the People."

Still using *fei* discourse, the younger Chiang had to face declining support for the ROC from other countries, many of whom had established diplomatic relations with the PRC; even the United States finally made early overtures to the PRC by establishing the United States Liaison Office in 1973. Chiang's diaries from 1975, the year his father died, show consistent uses of *fei* to name the CCP (of forty instances, thirty are *gongfei*): "For the remaining days of my life, I will have the all evil *gongfei* as my enemy, and will strive by all means." Beyond commenting on the prosperity of various locales in Taiwan and offshore islands, Chiang was most concerned with ROC's diplomatic relationships, especially with the United States. "What we must investigate thoroughly is what policies we should adopt if the United States recognizes *gongfei* [and] if major political

change happens in the region of *fei*, what we should do to face such changes" (Chiang, 1980b). Throughout the 1980s newspapers consistently labeled the U.S.-China relationship *mei fei guanxi* (*mei*, America, *guanxi*, relation), ensuring that use of *fei* would continue to describe relations between ROC and its formerly favored diplomatic partner.

The United States, as ROC's long-time friend and supporter through a containment policy against communism pursued since the early 1950s, was an integral feature of the *gongfei* narrative. For the United States to recognize the CCP as *the* representative of China vitiated *gongfei*'s venomous image, necessitating an alternative frame. Though Chiang continued to name the CCP *gongfei*, so that it would manifest in different aspects of Taiwanese life, *fei*'s appearances in his speeches subsided and lost much of the disapproving tone they had exhibited in previous discourse. In his 1978 inaugural speech, instead of focusing on CCP's cruelty, as his father and Yen had done, he dwelt on how to make ROC strong: "It further shows a compelling contrast [between the ROC and] the mainland *gongfei* regime as between love and violence, happiness and suffering, brightness and darkness, and the big Yes and the big No." Later, in 1978's National Day speech, Chiang similarly adopted this relatively matter-of-fact tone: "Today our enemy *gongfei* and their tyranny have yet to be eradicated."¹⁸

After China established diplomatic relations with the United States in January 1979, Chiang implemented the "Three Noes" policy: there would be no contact, no negotiation, and no compromise between ROC and PRC. The situation having changed, the identity broker had to recast his messages to realign with a new political order. The ethos undergirding this pronouncement was not so much to inspire hostility toward the Communists, as to urge citizens in Taiwan to "reverentially fortify the self, and not to be swayed in any changing circumstances" (*zhuangjing ziqiang, chubian bujing*). Although taking back the "stolen" mainland became a source of disillusionment, that *gongfei* continued to exist and loom large painted a tragic, heartrending picture: internationally, Taiwan became the increasingly isolated, lonely, and misunderstood "true representative" of China, its enduring status as "recovery base" contested and confused. Also, as *gongfei* had formed alliances with others, its "bandit" image faded accordingly.

Though it was difficult for other nations to recognize the "true color" of *gongfei*, they could at least acknowledge ROC's honorable spirit. With the evil *gongfei* making more friends, Taiwan's priority was to stand firmly on its own accomplishments. In fact, the ROC aspired to build itself as a model for China by following the Three Principles of the People: though the focus remained on unification, Taiwan gradually became an actor, rather than observer and rescuer, of the mainland. *Gongfei* continued to be a way to contrast with Taiwan, but seemed more the ground than the figure. Ironically, this may have been because of CCP's growing power. As *gongfei* became stronger, the ROC government was forced to pay more attention to itself and the Taiwanese identity, necessitating renegotiation. ROC's isolation also inspired people's demands for political democratization (Gold, 2003).

Gongfei continues to be invoked from time to time, though usually in the pragmatic tone we referenced earlier. In his 1979 New Year's Day speech, Chiang used *gongfei* four times and twice mentioned *feiwei zhengquan*, blaming the CCP for destroying "superior Chinese cultural traditions" and its tyranny toward the mainland and its people. In the 1980 New Year's Day speech, while avoiding *gongfei*, Chiang said, "we should put our eyes on the realization of the goal of anti-communism and recover the nation." The following year he used *fei* eight times—an increased frequency and forcefulness apparently intended to correspond with the 70th anniversary of the ROC—then skipped it the next three years. Although continuing to utter "Communist tyranny" (*gongchan baozheng*), he conspicuously omits *fei*. In 1985, Chiang mentioned *fei* twice (*feiwei zhengquan* and *zhonggong feidang*), marking its final appearance in New Year's Day speeches. Similar patterns can be observed in National Day speeches. In the 1979 and 1980 speeches the once pervasive *fei* is absent, resuming from 1981 onward, though only two to four times per speech, until finally disappearing in 1987, the year before Chiang died and Lee became president. Accordingly, "bandits" disappeared from the *ROC Yearbook*, much the same as it had done from the New Year's Day and National Day speeches.

After the United States severed diplomatic ties, *fei* progressively loosened its stronghold in official discourse. As its presence shrank, *fei* continued to linger and persist only in places where there was strong support of standard ROC ideology. Although by 1987 nationwide official speeches did not contain the word *fei*, Chiang Ching-kuo used it in speeches at a united graduation ceremony for military schools (October 19, 1987); in the KMT Central Standing Committee's multiple meetings (May 14 and November 25, 1987); and at Chiang Kai-shek's centennial plus one birthday celebration (October 30, 1987)¹⁹. *Fei* is not merely a rhetorical device, but encompasses a worldview shared by some more than others. The metaphor cannot vanish from all usage without some ideological revision, which the identity broker must manage skillfully. In situations where reclaiming the mainland continued as an ideology, *fei* endured, with its rhetorical energy even fortified. The *gongfei* ideology plays out differently on different sites at different times, and it can only retreat gradually and inconsistently, while still going through struggle, negotiation, and competition, resulting in a variegated pattern of suppression.

With the pretense of eventually reclaiming the mainland finally rent asunder, *fei* proved unable to embrace the changed reality of a momentous period that saw the removal of martial law and the transition of the presidency from Chiang Ching-kuo to Lee Teng-hui, the first native-born KMT leader and Taiwanese president. Chiang lifted martial law in 1987, six months before he died, and Lee Teng-hui became president in 1988. Lee initially followed Chiang's practices; while banning *gongfei/fei* from official presidential speeches, he continued using these names on occasions marked by deep anti-Communist ideology, such as his address to representatives of the Boy Scouts as President of the Association (May 27, 1988); his speech celebrating the thirtieth

anniversary of the 823 Artillery War in Kinmen²⁰ (August 24, 1988); his talk while awarding the *Juguang* medal to army soldiers (September 4, 1988); and so on²¹.

Initiating a new phase in Taiwan's political history, Lee, described as "the most unexpected political entrepreneur over the past decade" (Gold, 2003, p. 14), moved to terminate the Period of National Mobilization by abolishing *Temporary Provisions* on May 1, 1991. Nonetheless, *Additional Articles of the Constitution of the ROC* was implemented to recognize that China and Taiwan functioned under separate rules²². By acknowledging the CCP as a "political entity" (*zhengzhi shiti*, 政治實體)—though falling short of accepting it as a state—these acts ended more than forty years of designating the CCP as an "insurgent group" well deserving of the name *gongfei*. Such actions allowed Taiwan and China to enter into a quasi-normal relationship, necessitating yet another round of "rectification of names," supplanting *gongfei* with more "neutral" terms like *zhonggong* or *dalu* that had already been used for some time. All official sites were carefully examined, with 149 laws and policies whose measures concerned *gongfei* identified as needing revision in wording or being abolished. The previously censorious tone was ameliorated to be in line with the revised political vision of China and Taiwan as ruled by two separate "political entities."

Indeed, before termination was implemented, a series of efforts to rectify names on key discursive sites, such those having to do with education and national defense, had already begun. For example, the National Institute for Compilation and Translation (NICT, 國立編譯館), a governmental agency in charge of texts for education and other literature, removed the patriotic song, "Anti-Communist and Recover the Nation" (*fangong fuguo ge*) from music textbooks, as Chen Bi-hua (1991) reports: "Times have changed, there are different formats of 'anti-communism,' and 'fighting Russia' has already become a matter of the past." Moreover, "The NICT Head said...the contents of the song obviously do not fit the current situation and therefore [we] decided to delete it" (p. 4). The standard textbooks for elementary and junior high schools were also required to change names and phrases for the CCP and no longer featured heart-wrenching, terrifying stories about *gongfei*—such ideological state apparatuses also had to be aligned with new political realities. One news report makes this clear:

President Lee announced the termination of *Temporary Provisions* yesterday, and both sides of the Strait enter into a new era. NICT Head Zeng Ji-qun says that to take care of both the government's position and the reality, contents of the textbooks for both elementary and junior high schools will undergo considerable change.

Zeng explains that, in these textbooks, for statements of fact about the mainland region, neutral terms will be used. For example, "*gongfei*" will be replaced with "*zhonggong*," "*feijun*" (army of bandits) will be replaced with "*gongjun*" (army of

Communists), and "*feiqu*" (regions of bandits) with "*dalu diqu*" (mainland region). Every subject should be evaluated; inappropriate text must be revised and unsuitable pictures changed. (Li Ruo-song, 1991)

That Zeng claims preference for "neutral terms" means that more than forty years' usage of *gongfei* was *not* neutral, and thus there was a need to revise. Thanks to the tractability of the Chinese language, although *fei* is considered "inappropriate text," *gong* continues. The centrality of *gongfei* has long dwelt in *fei*, so when *gong* departs from *fei*, *gong* can itself become a new metaphorical root, from which new words and phrases—such as *zhonggong*, *gongdang*, *gongjun*, and so on—can be derived. The new worldview, confirmed by the transition from *fei* to *gong*, is that the CCP concerns communism, not banditry. As such, the anti-Communist position could no longer be assumed by ROC, let alone its self-ascribed duty to "recover the nation." This rectifying of names on discursive sites about education was an important first step, followed by comparative studies on the contents of textbooks by Taiwan and China (Chen, 1991).

The Ministry of Defense also started rectifying CCP names. The former "insurgent banditry" having only a "nest" was now a "regime," as CCP's name was rectified to "mainland authorities" (*dalu dangju*) or "Chinese Communist authority" (*zhonggong dangju*); its armed forces "armed forces of the Communists" (*gongjun* or *zhonggong junfang*); and cadres of the party and the military "cadres of Chinese Communists" (*zhonggong ganbu*). As of May 1, 1991, the military also replaced the once omnipresent political slogan, "Extinguish the All-Evil Communist Bandits, and Rescue Mainland Fellows from the Same Womb," with "Protect the Nation's Security, and Carry out the Grand Project of Unification." Still, the military made a point to emphasize that such revision did not imply a change in attitude toward Chinese Communists as enemies (Jin Zhao, 1991).

Much like implementation of the formal policy using *fei* to describe the CCP, the government's removal of *fei* expressions and their replacement required a new, comprehensive policy. In 1992, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) of ROC's Executive Yuan, the newly established unit in charge of mainland matters²³, issued *Main Points for Implementing Unifying Names for Zhonggong's Party, Governmental, and Military Organizations, Enterprises, Academic Institutions, Groups, Flags and Anthems, and Personnel Titles* (中共黨政軍機關企業學術機構團體旗歌及人員職銜統一稱謂實施要點). China was no longer seen as "bandits," but the ROC's gaze was now fastened on China as a political party with authority—*zhonggong* and *zhonggong dangju*—lessening the negativity and hostility associated with *fei*.

After Lee became KMT leader, and associated narratives had been revised, *gongfei* was set aside gradually without anyone ever confronting its spirit. From the time the Nationalists moved to Taiwan in 1949, the heavily promoted cluster of *gongfei* metaphors reduced in impact and eventually disappeared on most official discursive sites. For example, Article 21 of the *Radio and*

Television Act (RTA), which prohibits program contents against the national policy of anti-communism and recovering the nation, remained intact until 1993. The disappearance of *fei* coincides with a time that enabled "the remaking of Taiwan in virtually all spheres of life" (Gold, 2003, p. 11).

Nevertheless, in the early 1980s *gongfei* waned as its chilling, forbidding political metaphor clusters exited official discourse, only to see itself revived in the past decade as a nostalgic reference, migrating to such informal and unofficial venues as personal memoirs. While calling China "bandits" had been an official policy to incite patriotism, *gongfei* returned as a means to invoke the past amid a swarm of complex feelings and emotions. Especially after the local, pro-independence DPP won the presidency, ruling from 2000 to 2008, *gongfei* took on a new mien, deliberately invoked by DPP to condemn KMT's vacillating public positions. Aside from private realms, *gongfei* reappeared in more public, politically charged circumstances, but used by different proponents in somewhat ironic and curious political contexts.

Remembering Fei

As *gongfei* retreated from widespread public use, discursive sites for its use reclaimed some territory in private realms—albeit lessened in frequency—and concomitantly its meanings have been modified to be more in line with the new, multi-voiced Taiwanese society. Aided by the lifting of martial law, which removed constraints on the media, previously taboo topics could now be discussed openly and the volume of pages devoted to these issues also expanded.

From 1988 to 2000, the *United Daily News* had 324 essays containing *gongfei*, with 221 in the next ten years. Few of these occupied the front pages or concerned governmental announcements or official statements; if they did, they were more likely to criticize, rather than endorse/reflect governmental ideology. *Gongfei* now occurs in reader commentaries, whose contents depend as much on political affiliation as artistic inclination, recalling times past, and writers vary in their degree of engagement with *gongfei* ideology.

Some recall the chill of the "white terror," summoned by the name *gongfei*, during the presidencies of the two Chiangs; others object to oppression by the Nationalist government. Some discuss *gongfei* either as opponents they personally fought against, or as bystanders/audiences of a widely propagandized ideology. Still others idealize nostalgic recollections of the old days as less chaotic, albeit more restrictive. There are also essays recalling the prohibitions imposed on people, including banned books endorsing "incorrect ideology" and limiting broadcast programs using local languages. For some, *gongfei* is as much about the unknown but vicious enemy as about people in Taiwan, as they suffered during the time when they dreaded *gongfei*. *Gongfei* resurfaces in contemplative, even romantic, reflections concerning how such names have orchestrated Taiwan's identity, an impression that renders the once dangerous *gongfei* particularly enigmatic.

To many, *gongfei* represents a political framework that limits people's thought, and is only now fit to be part of critical, philosophical, and personal reflections.

That *gongfei* can now be managed from alternative perspectives, each reflecting its own emotional history—and often showing incongruity among its components—is well captured in the following example. In the early 1990s, when *gongfei* had just been "demoted" to a less vicious enemy in the wake of Taiwan's attempts to rediscover itself by admitting it did not own the mainland, a criminal gang counterfeiting RMB was captured. Its leader claimed he acted to disrupt *gongfei*'s economy and make money for the ROC, so that what he did was out of patriotism, and was not a crime. Oddly situated between two somewhat contradictory eras, for the counterfeiters to invoke *gongfei* as an enemy might even have succeeded had the CCP still been cast as an "insurgent group." Commenting on this event, Dai Du-xing (1991) laments,

Behind this ridiculously absurd reason lie factors of historical tragedy and distorted notions. It almost pushes everyone to a time past, a time of chilling ideology, a time of singing praises, a time of being ruled by myth, a time of political taboos, a time of white terror, a time of no human rights, a time of extreme suspicion, a time of ears on the wall, a time of pigeonholing people, a time that [the government would] rather kill [someone] innocent than to set a guilty one free...It was a time "patriotism" was the panacea that cured all...and no one can do anything about such a person. (p. 24)

For many, *gongfei* and "white terror" go hand-in-hand, their conjunction symbolizing forty years' oppression of people in Taiwan. Behind that convenient excuse there is a ludicrous history of profound sadness beginning with the February 28, 1947, massacre, when the KMT government killed more than ten thousand civilians in Taiwan for rebelling against KMT corruption and exploitation. The massacre initiated "white terror," when Taiwanese awakened to the idea of Taiwan's independence. Discussing the massacre was taboo until the late 1980s when articles and books started to discuss ranges of issues and events related to the massacre, including paying tribute to its victims and the extent to which the government should act to heal long-standing wounds.

A majority of articles published in *United Daily News* recall how *gongfei* thrived throughout Taiwanese society through propaganda and advertisements in print or broadcast media; in display through various artifacts; in slogans performed through various chants and songs; and so on. Also remembered were various activities that mobilized people of all ages to fight *gongfei*. Performance sites could be found at home; at school and in public areas; and in compulsory military service; among others. Gao Jia-yang (1994) recalls when students could collect *gongfei*'s propaganda documents dropped by air, exchanging them for money and/or rewards. To destroy these materials

from *gongfei*, a policy rewarded people for collecting advertisements from the *feiwei* [the bandit and the fake] and bringing them to a police station or school:

Whether it is the top of a tree, rooftop, rice field, or next to a small ditch, these materials could be found easily. At that time I was still an elementary school student and did not really understand these [advertisements] filled with words and pictures. Other than playing with these papers, most of the time we handed them in to teachers to get rewards like pencils [and] notebooks. But times have changed...we now even build bridges of communication, changing our long-established ideas that "we will win in anti-communism, and we will succeed in building our country," and "the Han and the thieves do not stand on the same ground." It really is "this moment is not that moment." (p. 30)

Children participated in *gongfei* propaganda in all innocence—Gao's action-oriented account of fighting *gongfei* vividly portrays how such political language can enter into the hearts of people in variegated configurations, to be enacted differently. Still, even if such innocence may help purify the patriotic spirit, when the essayist examines current reality, the result can only be absurd.

Memories are played out differently, based on divergent experiences. The changed position toward *gongfei* carries special meaning for those living in military villages (*juancun*, 眷村)—soldiers and their families who followed Chiang to Taiwan after 1949 settled in these government-sponsored villages hoping they would one day go back to the mainland after defeating *gongfei*. Many essays and reflections recall life experiences of those coming with the ROC government to Taiwan—how they managed day-to-day activities; how they made a living; how they settled in Taiwan under the shadow of "fighting *gongfei*"; and so on. Observing the changing histories, Kuo Kuan-ying (1991) recalls,

At that time the most widely circulated story in the military village was that some Chief Commander of the Defense Ministry in Kinmen had just taken office, and *gongfei* took his mother and communicated with him from across the ocean. He...had tears all over his face. There are several endings to the story. Some said our President was worried the Chief Commander would defect, so he was taken back to Taiwan. Some said that his mother was killed by *gongfei* because she did not succeed in persuading him to defect...at a time [when people believed] "I unify you; you unify me," everyone's brain was simplified. (p. 24)

Though people's thoughts may be rendered "simple," those accompanying Chiang to Taiwan saw their families torn apart due to tangled political ideologies and national identities. The story itself, and the recalling of it, was particularly effective in highlighting contradictions between physical nearness (at its closest, Kinmen and the Chinese mainland are separated by a mere 1.8 kilometers)

yet vast political distance (ROC versus PRC). As blood connections were forcibly severed, such stories became sagas, fortifying anti-*gongfei* spirit.

Gongfei's memory is particularly vivid in the offshore islands, considered the "frontier of the battlefield" (*qianxian*) against Communists, and changing times seem more to have confused than clarified its meanings. Gao Yi-song (1992) recalls his experience capturing bandit spies (*feidie*) in Kinmen, titling his essay, "Goodbye to the Era: Bandit Spies Used to be on Your Side," with the sub-heading, "how did *feidie* disappear"? "How did *gongfei* become *zhonggong*? How did bandit region (*feiqu*) become the mainland? Times have changed! But for those who have stayed in Kinmen, they will need more time to adjust" (p. 17). "Capturing *feidie*" was no longer practiced and even *gongfei* could surreptitiously enter Kinmen. More and more people in Kinmen went to the mainland to visit relatives and ancestors' tombs—putting themselves in *feiqu*, they must have felt they were living in different life circumstances (Gao Yi-song, 1992). Indeed, Kinmen's famous cutlery industry once acquired its materials from *gongfei*'s bombs, and of course friendlier overtures have also changed this practice. As several other articles noted, with *gongfei* no longer the enemy, offshore "frontier" islands had transformed their cultures.

The nostalgia continues even a decade later. In an award-winning essay—the 21st United Literary Award Short Novel Top Prize—concerning life on Matsu, another offshore island of Taiwan, the *Huaborong*²⁴ (2007) notes,

Everywhere in the village you can find political slogans such as "Exterminate the All Evil Communist Bandits," and "Anti Communist and Fight Russia, and Kill the Zhu and Pull its Hair"—made with concrete engraving and then painted with bright colors. Although these chilling slogans have long been outdated, they are like a stamp that never loses [its] magic power and seal the walls in an atmosphere of a certain time and space. (p. E7)

Recall the reference, "Kill the Zhu and Pull its Hair" (*shazhu bamao*), a popular slogan used during the "anti-Communist" era to disparage CCP leaders Mao Zedong and Zhu De. While these discussions center on nostalgia, other articles address how soldiers and other victims were sacrificed in various battles on the frontier islands.

Whether it is the island of Taiwan, or offshore or "frontier" islands, and whether it is a memory of profound sadness or innocence, the former chief enemy, *gongfei*, can now visit Taiwan for personal or official purposes. These conditions have commanded the attention of many writers. Questions concerning how people should assume new stances, jettisoning old conceptions of *gongfei*, have also been discussed. Such new orientations compel not just an altered look at *gongfei*, but self-examination of the *gongfei* viewpoint as expressed through, for example, anti-Communist literature. Wang De-wei (1994), discussing the passing of such literature, commented,

At this time when we talk about anti-Communist literature, where should we start? That side wants to unify, and this side wants independence. The "Han" and the "Thief" also stand on the same ground, and the "enemy" and "me" have already shaken hands. The sacred mission of some forty years ago has become an everlasting wonder. If anti-communism literature does not disappear now, when will it?...[However] it is an important part of Taiwan's literature experience...we have to ask, how has anti-Communist literature guided an era of Taiwan literature's discourse? (p. 43)

Such reflections published by *United Daily News* were seen most commonly before 1995. Afterwards, reminiscences appeared only infrequently, as people in Taiwan grew more and more distant from the notion of *gongfei*.

Of course, the apparently more artistic memories in *United Daily News* can be contrasted with the critical perspective taken by supporters of Taiwan's independence, such as those whose work appears in the *Liberty Times*, and who tend to look more critically at *gongfei* in light of its political implications. Chen Mao-xiong (2005a), for example, noted that the KMT had always listened to *gongfei*'s radio broadcasts to Taiwanese and knew that "*gongfei*" wanted Taiwanese to rebel against "the gang of Chiang *fei*." Although old usages were commonly understood, the phrases in which they were expressed were often marked with parentheses to denote their character as once-rectified names for China. Chen comments that the CCP did not really set out to advance Taiwan's independence, but to ally with Taiwan as its secondary enemy to battle against its primary enemy, the KMT. As the "united front" strategy implies, once the primary enemy was extinguished, the secondary enemy would then become the primary enemy.

As increasing contact with the mainland gradually removed the façade of its bandit reputation, a more pragmatic spirit has emerged and *fei*'s meaning has at times become instilled with a dash of playfulness. Through contextualization and recontextualization, the once-serious and politically charged *fei* seems to have temporarily separated from the longstanding threat the CCP held over ROC—put differently, the ongoing interaction with China is no longer cast as orienting with *gongfei*. As such, the mainland is no longer under Taiwan's gaze as a target to fight against in an effort to reclaim authority, but one that can reap profits. Taiwan has moved from being a reactive observer obsessed with the CCP, to a lively actor that decides what suits it best.

An example is "*gongfei* cake" (*gongfei bing*). According to one story, a man's relative's mainland bride made very good cakes, so they started to sell them in Chiayi. They named the store "*dalumei*" ("the mainland maiden") and the cake "*gongfei bing*" (*gongfei* cake, incorporating the family members' playful nickname—*gongfei*—for the mainland bride). Both names proved striking and memorable—each is composed of three characters that, even without rhythm, seem to

match—and attracted much attention, making for a profitable business. The man learned the recipe and marketed his own street vendor product, which he named—in another three characters— "illegal immigrant" (*touduke*)²⁵ (Lei Ming, 2002). In this context, *gongfei* is not something to fear, but to be engaged with and consumed; after all, many in Taiwan have mainland brides, so it is only natural to eat cakes produced by *gongfei*.

The seemingly long-forgotten past attracts attention in this unexpected, entertaining framework, and with the quality of the product, "*gongfei* cake" is franchised in many stores. As Xie Yu-hong (2004) humorously notes, "Although the confrontation between the two sides continues, the hot '*gongfei* cake' has already made it impossible for gourmants to 'go slow, be patient'" (p. B3). "Go slow, be patient" (*jieji yongren*, 戒急用忍) is another four-character political reference, recalling former president Lee's mainland policy advocating slow progress toward business interaction with China. Not only is this witty commentary filled with political implications, the cultural configuration continues in other manifestations of the business: all franchise employees wear clothing and caps of red, the color most associated with communism (*chifei*). This seamless integration of reinvented political and cultural discourse resonates well in Taiwan's fledgling democracy, a far cry from the "anti-communism and fight Russia moon cake" advertised in 1952.

In another report, some were said to have bought *gongfei* cake in Chiayi (the original store) before climbing a nearby mountain named *tufei* (*tu*, earth; *fei*, local, vulgar bandits). This mountain is steep, a feature leading many to find the name *tufei* appropriate, that is, *tufei* can be seen as an enemy one must make an effort to overcome. Moreover, as both *tufei* and *gongfei* share the same character *fei*, what could be more appropriate than to have a *gongfei* cake while fighting against a *tufei* mountain? *Fei*'s complicated, multi-layered meanings, varying in intensity, are realized in the acts of eating and exerting physical effort. As one reporter (Zheng Rong-wei, 2009) said, "Whether it is the *gongfei* cake or the *tufei* mountain, these interesting names are just to make you laugh. Don't be too serious in examining these from the political perspective." Advising one not to take the name too seriously paradoxically underscores the seriousness of this rich, politically charged metaphor.

Not all instances involving *gongfei* as nickname have as positive an outcome. In another instance, a couple married for twelve years got a divorce. Among other things, the mainland bride claimed that she was constantly abused by her Taiwanese husband, who used insulting language, hit her, and called her "*gongfei*" all the time (Guo Sheng-en, 2007). The article title put it this way: "Play Violence All Day, Calling [his] Wife *Gongfei*, Divorce Granted."

Such essays constitute one among many possible forms to express such reflections, yet they serve as a micro-lens allowing us to see diverse perspectives and variegated evolution in *gongfei*'s changing semantic implications. With development of the Internet, such reflections are posted online more and more—on websites, blogs, or even just comments to specific news articles,

among other venues—and continue to proliferate and reproduce themselves as feedback, debate, transfers, and making references that are just few clicks away. A Google search of *gongfei* on March 31, 2012, produced more than seven million results in seconds. Different discursive sites infuse *gongfei* with different kinds of vitality, and the reinvention and consumption of *gongfei* will continue to be involved in orchestrating new political configurations.

As the political struggle between the Nationalist government and the Chinese Communist regime has undergone fundamental change, *fei* continues to surface in various, ever-increasing non-official domains, though perhaps lessened in intensity, its affective connotations revised. It has become an entry portal to times past, with intervening years romanticizing the long-forgotten harsh political realities, as Taiwan's identity has been contemplated and reconstructed.

Fei as Political Irony

Since the lifting of martial law, *gongfei* has increasingly returned as an appropriate name for China. Ironically, in this context it is not generally uttered by Nationalists (or KMT supporters), as it once was, but by supporters of Taiwan's independence, as a reminder of KMT's political stance in times past. Changes in political leadership have enabled different kinds of political capital to be drawn from *gongfei* by different constituencies, as it continues to drift about various discursive sites.

As Taiwan continues to democratize, internal voices dissenting from KMT authority have grown stronger and Taiwan's local consciousness has continued to expand. The rise of DPP, established in 1987, and its victories in 2000 and 2004, have driven Taiwan's transformation from a one-party authoritarian regime to a principally two-party democratic political system. This new balance has forced reconfiguration of the triad comprising the KMT, the DPP, and the CCP.

In the early 1990s, Lee acknowledged that Taiwan does not control the mainland, hence "China unification" was set as a long-term goal. Even before DPP became the ruling party, contesting voices against China-centered ideology flourished as the discourse space opened up. As center of this nexus, *gongfei* became a new target, with different postures taken. For example, in a combined election in 1994, DPP provincial legislator candidate Chang Ching-fang promoted a strategy called, "Defeat the fellow traveler of *gongfei*, depose Jaw Shaw-kong by all people." Jaw was a legislator and long-time KMT member until 1993 when he joined the New Party (NP), which endorses unification with China.

The "fellow travelers of *gongfei*"—*gongfei de tongluren* ("one who walks on the same route as *gongfei*")—was an old expression of the Nationalist government, particularly during the "white terror" era, to brand supporters of Taiwan's independence. To level this name at someone effectively constituted a charge of treason, with offenders—many of whom were precursors to the DPP—harshly punished according to Criminal Code 100, at least prior to its revision. This recalled a time when "bandit spies" had to be reported to the authorities. To use "fellow travelers

of *gongfei*" to name KMT/NP is thus bizarre and ironic, even misplaced, as these "travelers" would have been the very supporters of independence that the government wanted to prosecute.

To such charges, an editorial in the *United Daily News* ("Comprehensive 'United Front'", 1994) criticized how "fellow travelers of *gongfei*" had been twisted into naming KMT as unificationists:

When words such as "*gongfei*" have gradually become history, in today's Taiwan it has become popular to accuse people of being "bandit spies" and "fellow travelers of *gongfei*." Hit by such bullets, even an ambiguous claim such as "unification" has become a target of condemnation. People are on the one hand coerced by it, and at the same time have to accept the government's claim that "unification is our long-term goal." How could they not be confused about their cognition? How could they not have perplexed feelings about their national identity? (p. 2)

That the *ROC Constitution* continues to endorse a China-centered perspective seems at odds with a burgeoning Taiwan-centered identity. In such a conflictual political climate, while the ROC government no longer treats Chinese Communists as *gongfei*, the ROC national policy of anti-communism has comprised, for some, political capital. In a similar vein, commenting on a DPP officer's claim that he would organize a communist party in Taiwan to combat KMT's bribery in elections, and DPP's penalty for his misconduct, an editorial in the *United Daily News* noted:

Just before [the opening up of both sides], communism in Taiwan was called "*gongfei*"...Now when we talk about the time of "protecting secrecy and espionage," it sounds like a historical joke. And yet, it is in exactly such a climate of political transformation that "communism in Taiwan" becomes a news topic...there are people who attack and make fun of the "anti-communism and recover the nation" [policy]...as if the name of a political party is just a shield that can be easily borrowed. If all that is left for the Communist party in Taiwan is a name to be exploited, then comparing that with those days past when the whole country was on guard [against the CCP] is indeed a travesty of history. ("Communist Party in Taiwan," 1994)

The irony is unavoidable: the once hostility-saturated *gongfei* must now be reframed as Taiwan and China start on a friendlier relationship. When associate director Tang Shubei of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS, formed in 1991) came to visit Taiwan on August 5, 1994, DPP protesters held cloth banners which read, "Taiwan wants independence," and "Talk between *guo* [KMT] and *gong*, people rebound." At the same time, speakers on cars announced, "[We] won't let *gongfei* enter the windy city [*Xinzhū*]," and demanded of the police why they wanted to "protect *gongfei*." Similar episodes continued from time to time, especially during elections.

Having lost the 2004 presidential election a second time to DPP's incumbent President Chen Shui-bian, leaders in KMT and other parties that had split from KMT became friendlier toward, and more ready to reach out to, China, claiming that DPP was unable to handle China matters. As KMT continued to endorse "Chinese consciousness" and to find it politically beneficial to cultivate closer ties with China, the DPP prioritized "Taiwanese consciousness" and warned people that China was untrustworthy. The new configuration, with KMT aligning itself with the CCP in opposition to DPP, is commonly referred to as *guogong yijia qin* (the *guo* and the *gong* belong to one intimate family); note the disappearance of *fei*.

As the ROC pursued its long-standing position that people in Taiwan fight against *gongfei*, such reversals have proven particularly ironic for independence backers. For them, using words such as *gongfei* and "stole" only serve to foreground the altered positions of the KMT. In criticizing KMT's closer alliance with CCP, rather than DPP, President Chen said:

They [KMT] strongly advocated peace talks with the other side [CCP], but they never set their bottom line at asking the other side not to eliminate the "Republic of China"; [but] when they try to reconcile with DPP, they ask DPP to give up independence—the DPP party theme. No wonder some people claim that they are the fellow travelers of the "*gongfei*." (Chen Mao-xiong, 2005b)

KMT no longer seems to cling to its anti-Communist position, which has been adopted by DPP and other independence supporters to handily exploit *gongfei*'s political capital. Concurrent with KMT's increased cooperation with the CCP, *gongfei*- or *fei*-related commentaries have become prevalent in, for example, the pro-independence paper, *Liberty Times*. In the reader's column, a writer with the pen name of Tainan Guest (2005) stated, "Taiwan's security is very precarious, *gongfei* are the kidnapers, Taiwanese businesspeople are their hostages, and our government and people are the families of hostages." Invoking this timeworn usage reminds one of the KMT's changed positions. Consider also this bit of doggerel by the political satirist Xie Zhi-wei (2005):

不提當年打共匪	Not to mention fighting against <i>gongfei</i> in those years,
<i>Buti dangnian da gongfei</i>	
且看如今甜蜜嘴	Just see how sweet their mouths have become;
<i>Qiekan rujin tianmi zui</i>	
與其求人腿夾尾	To beg with one's tail hidden,
<i>Yuqi qiuren tui jia wei</i>	
不如求仁終不悔	[I'd] rather seek human-heartedness without regrets.
<i>Buru qiuren zhong bu hui</i>	

Chen Mao-xiong (2005b) also notes,

What is so sad is that, at a time [in the distant past] when "*gongfei*" showed its benevolence to Taiwanese and those who supported Taiwan's independence, they did not ally with "*gongfei*" to fight against "*gongfei*'s" main enemy [the KMT]. Yet today's China-centered power [the KMT] claims to protect the "Republic of China," and chooses to dance with the enemy [the CCP] which wants to extinguish "the Republic of China"...Pan-blue dares to play the "*gongfei*" card...[to] force DPP to recede to "*gongfei*."

Beginning in late March 2005, KMT Chairperson Lien Chan and Vice-Chair Chiang Ping-kun; People's First Party Chairperson Soong Chu-yu; and New Party Chairperson Yok Mu-ming, all visited China. After KMT Vice-Chair Chiang visited China, criticism from Taiwan independence supporters surfaced again; as an example, "The KMT cannot explain why, under the circumstances of the once all evil *gongfei*, who at present is still using armed forces to threaten Taiwan, *guo* [and] *gong* have become holding-hands compatriots" (Huang Zhong-rong, 2005). Some wondered if KMT leaders had forgotten what the two Chiangs taught them, and Wang Yu-zhong (2005) set out to remind them:

Chiang Ching-kuo...put it clearly, almost six decades ago, only twice was *gongfei* disguised with a sincere gesture to infiltrate the national revolution and [use the opportunities to] develop themselves. "There is no such thing as 'cooperation' between the two parties." Regarding this history of cooperation between KMT and CCP, historians may have different interpretations, but at least for the KMT party members, they should not have forgotten the "Party Lesson" learned through painful blood and tears!

It is as if the *gongfei* usage, long abandoned by the KMT, has now been picked up by supporters of independence as a measured reminder of KMT's infidelity to its own established position—the gesture is obvious as the author continues to address China as "China" and uses *gongfei* deliberately to make telling points. Also foregrounded is KMT's refusal to work with the DPP. These rebuttals all sound a key theme: "Lien and Soong would rather hold hands with *gongfei* who in the past stole the KMT's territory, than to reconcile with the a-Bian regime by election" ("Pro Communist Lowers Oneself," 2005).

Instances of *fei* were found in editorials, as well as in readers' commentaries. Criticism against pan-blue politicians intensified after Lien's visit to China in April. The trip was framed as "a journey for peace," with supporters boasting that it was the first time a KMT leader had ever come into contact with Chinese Communists since Chiang lost the Chinese civil war in 1949, opening the door to what some call "the third time of cooperation" of *guogong*.

Perhaps most perplexing to some was Lien's, "Alliance with the Communists to Repress Taiwan's Independence," or *liangong zhi taidu*, an agreement Lien reached with China. Since the KMT has always supported the Republic of China, according to the policy, Taiwan's independence would signal departure from the Sinic world, not to mention that Taiwan has long been considered part of China—as a "springboard" or "model province"—rather than a rival. Recall the well-known Nationalist slogan from times past, "Taiwan's independence (*tai du*) is Taiwan's poison (*tai du*)," an utterance that manipulates Chinese homophones to cast those advocating Taiwan's independence as bandit spies (*feidie*) in line with *gongfei*, hence poisonous. As times change, *gongfei* is no longer allied with *tai du*, but is the KMT's ally—hence it can no longer be called *gongfei*—to suppress Taiwan's independence. "In just a few decades," Zhang Rui-zhen (2005) lamented, "the party who yelled anti-communism in the past is now competing to hold hands and eat and drink with 'gongfei.'"

Gongfei lingers as political sarcasm, seemingly opposite in direction from its original intent, spreading as occasions allow, with its meaning crystallized in a 2008 visit of China's top envoy Chen Yunlin. After Ma became president earlier that year and KMT returned to power, a series of official visits between representatives of China and Taiwan were immediately undertaken to build closer ties. Chen Yunlin, head of ARATS, met with Chiang Pin-kung, head of SEF, to discuss four economic issues (direct flights, shipping links, postal links, and food safety); he was the highest-ranking Chinese official to visit Taiwan since 1949 and the occasion marked the first time Taipei and Beijing held talks at that level in Taiwan (Rickards, 2008).

Worried such steps would push Taiwan into becoming part of China, pan-green supporters objected to Chen's visit. The visit generated extensive controversy as the government called up a significant police presence to protect Chen and suppress protests erupting at various locations. Display of the ROC national flag and other objects/activities emphasizing Taiwan's identity (such as singing songs in Taiwanese) were forbidden by the government (though such actions were officially denied), apparently to stay on good terms with Chen. Pan-green supporters interpreted the government's actions as indicating agreement with the position of China (or *gongfei*) toward Taiwan, that it is not a state and does not possess sovereignty. Others contended that such actions actually demonstrated ROC's sovereignty, since it exerted power to protect a foreigner [Chen] and tried to negotiate peaceful interaction with the government Chen represents (Hu Nian-zu, 2008).

Thus, after *gongfei* had been invoked sporadically since 2005, by the end of 2008, it had reignited the passion—or pain, if you will—of independence-minded Taiwanese. Prior to Chen's arrival, DPP-led pan-green supporters hung a banner above a street Chen's car would travel, reading, "*Gongfei* Get Out," as the key phrase, and above that, "Taiwan Does Not Belong to China." Similar banners were posted in locations near police stations and other places where Chen would visit or stay. Such media were placed in other cities, a strategy the DPP dubbed "flowering

everywhere." One of the most dramatic protests was conducted by four female DPP legislators, who checked into the Grand Hotel the night before Chen's visit, and at 11:50 a.m. when Chen arrived, unfurled two long cloth banners—one reading in English "Taiwan is Taiwan," and the other in Chinese, "Chen *fei* Yunlin Get Out" (*chen fei yunlin gundan*, 陳匪雲林滾蛋) ("Female Legislators Broke Enclosure," 2008). Notice how Chen is named Chen *fei* Yunlin, recalling the official practice from before 1987. Referring to Chen as *fei* was also common among many other DPP parliament representatives and their supporters.

In Chiayi, electric transfer boxes and telephone booths were sprayed with protest messages such as, "*Gongfei* Get Out, Taiwan is Not Part of China," and "Here Comes the *Gongfei*." People also went to police stations to report, "Chen Yunlin is a *gongfei* and should be arrested" ("Telephone Booths Sprayed," 2008). This recalls the slogan advising how people should report on "bandit spies," a political operation initiated in the 1950s and lasting more than thirty years.

During Chen's visit, protesters also made clear their opinions in places Chen visited by throwing eggs, resulting in several conflicts, and even physical altercations. Criticism of KMT's friendly overtures toward the CCP mushroomed and instances of the usage of *fei* increased. During Chen's visit in November, many news articles in the pro-DPP *Liberty Times* have titles containing *gongfei*: "Swiss Imprison *Gongfei*" (November 3); "*Gongfei* is Innocent but the National Flag is Guilty" (November 4); "Here Comes *Gongfei*..."; "CCT's L. Chai Reports, to Shouts of, '*Gongfei* Get Out'" (November 5); and "'Fellow Travelers of *Gongfei*' Finally Appear" (November 8), along with another 39 articles containing the word *gongfei*.²⁶

This compares to a total of nineteen articles, during the same period, in the pro-KMT *United Daily News*, none of which had *gongfei* in their titles.²⁷ Rather, these articles are either reports of conflict between DPP and KMT legislators, or editorials disputing DPP's claims and disparaging its actions. KMT legislators remarked sarcastically concerning DPP's love for the ROC flag, claiming that Taiwan should not greet guests with firecrackers and eggs (Zhan San-yuan, 2008). Although there was no response to the name *gongfei*, it is intriguing that Chen is called a "guest," a change from the CCP as an evil enemy to be extinguished at all costs, to a guest to be treated on good terms. An editorial ("These Five Days," 2008) states:

Regardless, the relation between the two sides is the heaviest of the heavy weights in assessing Taiwan's good and bad fortune. Chen's visit is the critical time for the DPP to decide on its policy between the two sides. Taiwanese people will contemplate: if DPP were to rule again with its appeal for a "Taiwan Nation," or with its language and physical violence, how could a "peaceful and stable" relation between the two sides be maintained?...

Filled with emotion, losing rationality and focus is today's DPP...regarding the four issues discussed in the meeting with Chen, the DPP has not said "no" to any of them...is all that is left of DPP concern for Chen's visit...abundant "catching *gongfei*" slogan and the "Taiwan nation" flag everywhere?

The energetic re-emergence of the *gongfei* slogan—and the counter-representations it stimulates—highlight the contradictory layers of Taiwanese identity revealed through its disconcerted relations with China, the prominent *other* always configured in Taiwan's self-reflected image. After nearly a half century of push-pull struggle on many fronts, the status of CPP as "*gongfei*" or as "guest" has switched in terms of who supports these positions and it has achieved a new equilibrium. Perhaps the only thing not changed is KMT's continued branding of Taiwan's independence supporters as tainted with violence. Taiwan's identity negotiations continue to be unsettled.

The practice of using *gongfei* to mock China and also KMT's changed position continues. An event referenced earlier, in which the *Liberty Times* criticized China's boycott of Taiwan's representatives at the Tokyo International Film Festival, leading to the editorial, "The Ugly Face of *Gongfei* Appears Again" ("Ugly Face," 2010), is just one more example of such mismatches in Taiwan's ever-changing political rhetoric. Since the 2012 presidential election has again ignited a fierce struggle between KMT and DPP, whether Soong Chu-yu, Chairperson of the People First Party, would join the race and change the equilibrium seems to have worried incumbent President Ma, given that both he and Soong are in the pan-blue camp. One political cartoon shows an ROC military officer standing next to Ma, telling other officers aiming at a tied-up Soong, "Comrades, our goal is not to extinguish *gongfei*, but rather to extinguish Soong Chu-yu" (*Lieren*, 2011).

Bandits Reconsidered and Taiwanese Identities

From 1949, the dream (or obsession) of Chiang Kai-shek to take back the mainland, as well as its revision and subsequent abandonment, has permanently configured Taiwan's troubled identity project. *Fei* summarizes Taiwan's struggle to fashion its own identity during a time when it saw that identity mainly through the reflected image of *gongfei*. As Taiwan moved from rule by KMT to DPP (and back to KMT in 2008); from authoritarian regime to removal of martial law; and from no contact with China to an "open door" policy; the identity project involving *gongfei* has also been maneuvered to suit various political agendas and to stimulate action in changing situations.

Gongfei provided the basis for the Nationalist government's identity project to embrace a distant locale that ROC claims, but does not own, and an opponent who shares incongruent culture, ethnicity, and politics. In his 1952 New Year's Day speech, Chiang Kai-shek made it clear that building Taiwan is only a means to an end:

Building Taiwan is to build Taiwan as a base for anti-communism and recovering the nation, and build it as an anti-Communist bastion in the Far East. The purpose

of building Taiwan, and even the entire nation, Asia, or the humankind of the whole world, [its space] is not limited to Taiwan and [its time] is not limited to the present. Everyone must deeply understand the grand goal of building Taiwan and its everlasting meaning, in order to overcome all the destitution and obstacles.

This stance is affirmed in a 1959 patriotic song, "The Good About Taiwan" [*taiwan hao*], whose lyrics state, "Taiwan is good, Taiwan really is an island for reclaiming [the mainland]... We will soon fight back to the mainland. We are coming back, soon coming back." Assuming the role of enforcer of justice, Taiwan, defined as an ROC province, saw itself pursuing a sacred mission that became a myth, which, while about something distant, is nevertheless infused with emotion and patriotism. It would not be until *gongfei* was extinguished and the grandeur of Chinese culture restored that people could reclaim the glory of the "motherland."

Taiwan's focus on the other makes it difficult, if not impossible, to identify a center of its own. Occupying only a transitory position, the "springboard" was to be built not for the sake of strengthening the springboard itself, but its function in reaching a more distant destination temporarily occupied by *gongfei*. This sensation of impermanence defines Taiwan's identity as transitory both in time and space and perhaps even irrelevant to some of its citizens. *Gongfei* signals a yet-to-be recovered authentic Chinese locale, rendering those who came with Chiang in 1949—late immigrants having direct blood connections to mainland dwellers—unable to be anything but guests merely passing time. As for early immigrants, Chinese authenticity is not only yet to be recovered but also to be *discovered*. The Nationalist government's promotion of Mandarin Chinese as the standard for participating in any state-related agencies, along with practices privileging late Chinese immigrants' cultural, political, and educational life (Rigger, 2003), imposed upon early immigrants a double burden: they had to first learn to become like Chinese (or be transformed from their principally Japanese enculturation into sharing more Chinese qualities), and then had to help salvage Chinese authenticity on the *gongfei*-occupied mainland.

Viewed through the lens of *gongfei*, Taiwan's identity is based on paradox. Its enemies are no better than "thieves," yet its eventual dream is to restore a "grand China." Since the ROC was "abandoned" and "betrayed" by many countries, with their common link to the mainland and the great mission of rescuing people from the irredeemably evil common enemy *gongfei*, all people in Taiwan—regardless of when they arrived—were called upon to unite with each other. The unifying power of *gongfei* helped erase the cultural and political divisions between early and late Chinese immigrants, as well as between people in Taiwan and China. Appealing to primordial ties and ethnicity, the government promoted a vision of common destiny, and hence shared identity. Taiwan is at the same time paradoxically focused upon, and beyond, itself; Chinese authenticity must be restored if Taiwan is to function as a center to be expanded throughout all Asia and even all humankind.

As an identity project, *gongfei* carries abundant force; legitimized by official institutions, it informs people in Taiwan who they are and ought to be, and who they are not and ought not to be. This Chinese-centered identity project has not gone unchallenged, however, especially as the Nationalist government's capacity to impose an official identity was weakened, beginning in the 1970s (Gold, 2003). Structurally, the ROC lost formal ties with many key partners in the international community. Generational change loosened ties to the Chinese mainland and caused early immigrants to receive an education that helped them become better assimilated as "Chinese," making them more like late immigrants. Culturally, nativist movements aspired to be Taiwan-centered, such as through authentic Taiwanese literature. Political demonstrations such as the Chung-li incident in 1977²⁸ and the Formosa incident in 1979 also erupted, with activists demanding democracy and self-determination.

After 1987 the government no longer propagated *gongfei* to excite patriotism, as it no longer saw China as a bandit-like enemy to fight against. This changed posture obliged pursuit of alternative projects, to look to other names to better resonate with evolving political realities. Under Lee Teng-hui, following Chiang Ching-kuo's lead, the government implemented a new policy rectifying China's names as *zhonggong* and/or *dalu*—elements of a new identity project that embarked on a fresh political era with alternative discourse about the other. The cultural movement became confluent with movements for political democratization and self-determination, while "Taiwanese identity" and "Taiwanese national identity" also became inextricably intertwined (Gold, 2003).

Dropping *gongfei* has allowed Taiwan better opportunities to turn its gaze more on itself, as it no longer serves as a "springboard" to a place in need of rescue nor carries the burden of restoring Chinese cultural authenticity. The alternatively named other—now *zhonggong* or *dalu*—is less a vicious common enemy than a party with a competing ideology, with whom Taiwan must engage. Still bound to the "one China" policy, the new ethos for Taiwan is more to compete with *zhonggong* than subdue *gongfei*. Taiwan moved from being a temporary base whose identity was embedded within and even engulfed by a preoccupation with *gongfei*, to a more self-focused, independent political entity ready to fight against the other, if not by force, then by succeeding as a "model province of the Three Principles of the People." Although the stated goal of building Taiwan has remained the same since the Nationalists moved there, the purpose of building Taiwan is now for Taiwan's own sake and to stimulate *zhonggong* to emulate it, rather than a means to extinguish *gongfei*.

Gradually, Taiwan has turned its gaze upon itself. As the opponent's face has changed, late and early immigrants have also reconfigured their integration: while a less fearsome and evil "common enemy" may reduce internal integration, the fact that Chinese authenticity is to be found in Taiwan rather than in the mainland compels a different kind of integration.

The phase of Taiwan's identity project, carefully managed by Lee Teng-hui, was followed by Chen Shui-bian, from 2000 to 2008. Moving Taiwan step-by-step even closer to its center, Chen eventually refused to call China any of the euphemisms implemented by the KMT—whether *gongfei*, *zhonggong*, or *dalu*—and called China, simply, "China."

Interestingly, as the government changed identity projects multiple times through embracing different names for China, other stakeholders held to *gongfei* to support alternative projects of their own. This renewed view is predicated on *gongfei* fading and becoming unsustainable on official sites, yet reappearing in sentimental reflections and as political mockery. From being the dominant discourse on all Taiwan sites for over forty years, *gongfei* has managed to re-emerge in different venues. By attempting to re-contextualize *gongfei*, this new effort is a way to extend the government's identity project into multifaceted domains.

While the nostalgic reflections about *gongfei* cascading through unofficial discursive sites may not have legitimized martial law and the authoritarian rule of the Nationalists, reconstructing an image of the "good old days"—even if they were not so good—helped revamp the past as somewhat more tolerable and memorable, and even the all-evil Communist bandits may not have seemed so evil after all. *Gongfei* became a point of entry to a seemingly forgotten past, with its negative connotations largely neutralized and KMT's authoritarian rule forgiven—the more so as *gongfei*'s connotations lightened through its use as a humorous term for business practices or for people from China. Even the invoking of *gongfei* by supporters of Taiwan's independence, as a politically charged reminder of KMT's changing positions, falls short of re-enacting its "evil" connection to times past, especially since the younger generation had not personally experienced that historical period and many in Taiwan now have direct contact with China. As *gongfei* increasingly becomes a legend, it continues to serve as a reference point for Taiwanese to construct their own identities; nevertheless, it is no longer an enemy to be redeemed but an ironic past through whose image people in Taiwan can see themselves.

Fei evolved through idiosyncratic historical-political contexts, intertwining in multiple layers, burdened with historical presuppositions reflecting the struggle between Taiwan and China. *Fei*'s meanings have been constantly revised and contested, as domestic and international politics continue to transpire and respond to alternative conceptions of Taiwanese identity. The waxing and waning of *gongfei* as official designator of China in Taiwan's political discourse indexes the change in the ROC government's attitude toward China and the transformation of Taiwanese identities as situated vis-à-vis China. Infusing all such efforts at forging identity is a simultaneous push and pull between land and people, as the drama of world politics unfolds.

Official Documents Consulted

1. Nationalist Government, 1947, July 15. Document No. 0744, case title: "From now on all names for the Communist Party should all consistently use '*gongfei*.'"
2. Executive Yuan, 1947, July 23. Document No. 29038, announces the policy and also specifies various governmental units in using *fei* and its related expressions.
3. Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (善後救濟總署), 1947, August 18. Document No. 28647, case title: "To request continual use of the same name for the Communist party, so as to facilitate official documentation with regard to the exchange of products and materials between this Administration and the representatives of the Communist region [*gongqu*]."
4. Executive Yuan, 1947, August 28. Document No. 34283, case title: "Concerning the request of Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to continue using the same name for Communist party, so as to facilitate official documentation with regard to the exchange of products and materials between this Administration and the representatives of the Communist region."
5. Nationalist Government, 1947, August 30. Document No. 0872 granted the request.
6. KMT Central Reform Committee, 1952, April 9. Document Number 3669, proposing "A Comprehensive Policy on Unifying Propaganda Phrases and Names for the Mainland" (對大陸宣傳名詞稱謂統一規定表).
7. Executive Yuan, 1957, July 26. Document No. 4107: Ordering the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to rectify the names for the CCP when giving speeches or talks in public areas.
8. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1957, August 1. Document No. 01032: Informing all ROC embassies in foreign countries to follow the instructions.
9. Executive Yuan, 1957, August 19, Central Document Number 235: Rectifying names for China: "Main points on unifying names for Zhu and Mao *gongfei* and other relevant terms" (統一對朱毛共匪及有關名稱要點).
10. Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) of the Executive Yuan, 1992: "Main Points for Implementing Unifying Names for *Zhonggong's* Party, Governmental, and Military Organizations, Enterprises, Academic Institutions, Groups, Flags and Anthems, and Personnel Titles" (中共黨政軍機關企業學術機構團體旗歌及人員職銜統一稱謂實施要點)

APPENDIX A: KEY EVENTS IN NAMING CHINA

<i>Year</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Key Events</i>	<i>Key Naming Issues</i>
1945		Japan surrenders Taiwan to the ROC	
1947	2.28	February 28th incident	
	7.15		Nationalist Government Document No. 0744: "From now on all names for the Communist Party should all consistently use 'gongfei.'"
	12.25	<i>ROC Constitution</i> enacted	
1948	5.10	<i>Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion</i> (動員勘亂時期臨時條款)	
1949	5.20	Martial law declared	
	12.7	Nationalists retreat to Taiwan	
1952	4.9		KMT Central Reform Committee proposes (Document Number 3669) "A Comprehensive Policy on Unifying Propaganda Phrases and Names for the Mainland" (對大陸宣傳名詞稱謂統一規定表)
1954- 1955		First Taiwan Strait crisis	
1954	11.25	Council for Design and Research on Recovering Mainland	
	12.3	Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty	

1957	8.19	Executive Yuan (Central Document Number 235): "Main Points on Unifying Names for Zhu and Mao <i>Gongfei</i> and Other Relevant Terms" (統一對朱毛共匪及有關名稱要點).
1958	8.9	Second Taiwan Strait crisis
1967	7.28	Chinese culture renaissance movement
1971	10.25	ROC expelled from United Nations (UN General Assembly Resolution 2758)
1975	4.5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chiang Kai-shek dies • Yen Chia-kan becomes president
1978	5.20	Chiang Ching-kuo becomes ROC president
1979	1.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ROC's severs ties with United States • <i>Taiwan Relations Act</i> becomes effective
	12.10	Kaohsiung (Formosa) incident
1987	7.15	Martial law lifted
	11.2	Open door policy: family-related visits to Mainland allowed
1988	1.13	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chiang Ching-kuo dies • Lee Teng-hui becomes ROC president

	8.18	Inter-Agency Mainland Affairs Committee of Executive Yuan
1990	10.7	National Unification Council
1991	1.28	Mainland Affairs Council
	2.23	<i>National Unification Guidelines</i>
	3.9	Strait Exchange Foundation
	5.1	<i>Temporary Provisions during the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion</i> abolished
		<i>Additional Articles of the Constitution of the ROC</i>
1992	7.31	Implementation of <i>Statute Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area</i>
	11.19	Mainland Affairs Council (MAC): "Main Points for Implementing Unifying Names for <i>Zhonggong's</i> Party, Governmental, and Military Organizations, Enterprises, Academic Institutions, Groups, Flags and Anthems, and Personnel Titles" (中共黨政軍機關企業學術機構團體旗歌及人員職銜統一稱謂實施要點)
1995	6.7-6.10	Lee's visit to Cornell University

1995-96	6 3	Third Taiwan Strait crisis	
1996	5.20	First direct ROC presidential election, Lee elected as ROC President	
1998	12.21	"Taiwan province" "frozen"	
1999	7.9		Lee's "Special State-to-State" narrative
2000	3.24	Lee steps down as KMT Chairperson	
	5.20	Chen assumes ROC presidency— transfer of power from the KMT to DPP	
	5.20	Chen's pledge, "Four Noes and One Without (<i>sibuyimeiyou</i>)"	
2002	8.3		Chen's "China and Taiwan, one country on each side" narrative
2004	5.20	Chen continues as ROC President	
2005	4.26-5.3	Lien Chen's "Peace Journey" to China; other pan-blue politicians visit China	
2006	2.27	<i>National Unification Council</i> (UNC) "ceases" to function	
2006	4.14-15	<i>Guogong</i> Forum (Cross-Straits Economic Trade and Culture Forum) established	

2008	5.20	Ma assumes ROC presidency
	9.3	Ma's "special non-state-to-state relation" narrative
2010	6.29	Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)
2012	5.20	Ma re-elected as ROC President
2013	6.21	Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services (still awaits ratification)
2014	3.18	Sunflower Student Movement

APPENDIX B: TRANSLITERATION OF KEY CHINESE TERMS

<i>Dalu</i>	大陸	The mainland
<i>Dalu baozheng</i>	大陸暴政	Tyranny of the mainland
<i>Dalu tongbao</i>	大陸同胞	Mainland fellows from the same womb
<i>Dalu zhengce</i>	大陸政策	Mainland Policy
<i>Dangju</i>	當局	Authority
<i>Diqu</i>	地區	Region
<i>Duian</i>	對岸	Opposite shore
<i>Fangong kange</i>	反共抗俄	Anti-communism and against Russia
<i>Feiwei zhengquan</i>	匪偽政權	Bandits' fake regime
<i>Fuxing jidi</i>	復興基地	Recovering base
<i>Gongchandang</i>	共產黨	Communist party
<i>Gongfei</i>	共匪	Communist bandits
<i>Guogong</i>	國共	KMT and CCP
<i>Guomindang</i>	國民黨	KMT
<i>Haixia liangan</i>	海峽兩岸	Both shores of Taiwan Strait
<i>Hanjian</i>	漢奸	Traitors to Han
<i>Huaren</i>	漢人	Han people
<i>Jieji yongren</i>	戒急用忍	Go slow, be patient
<i>Jiuer jingshen</i>	九二精神	1992 Spirit
<i>Jiuer jingshen</i>	九二共識	1992 Consensus
<i>Liangan</i>	兩岸	Both shores
<i>Liangan guanxi</i>	兩岸關係	Relations between the two shores
<i>Liangan sandi</i>	兩岸三地	Two shores and three places
<i>Panluan</i>	叛亂	Insurgence
<i>Sanminzhuyi tongyi zhongguo</i>	三民主義統一中國	Unifying China by the Three Principles of the People
<i>Sibu yi meiyou</i>	四不一沒有	Four No's and One Without
<i>Tiaoban</i>	跳板	The springboard
<i>Tongbao</i>	同胞	Fellows from the same womb
<i>Wuzu gonghe</i>	五族共和	Five ethnic groups under one family
<i>Xiaomie wane gongfei, jiejiu Dalu tongbao</i>	消滅萬惡共匪 解救大陸同胞	Extinguish the All-Evil Communist Bandits and Rescue mainland Fellows from the Same Womb
<i>Zhengming</i>	正名	Rectification of names
<i>Zhonggong</i>	中共	The Chinese communists
<i>Zhongguo</i>	中國	China
<i>Zhongguoren</i>	中國人	Chinese
<i>Zhonghua</i>	中華	Chinese
<i>Zhonghua minzu</i>	中華民族	Chinese ethnicity
<i>Zhonghuaminguo</i>	中華民國	The Republic of China
<i>Zhonghuarenmingongheguo</i>	中華人民共和國	The People's Republic of China

<i>Zhongyuan</i>	中原	Central plain
<i>Zhuangjingziqiang,</i> <i>chubianbujing</i>	莊敬自強 處變不驚	Reverentially fortify the self, and not to be swayed in any changing circumstances
<i>Ziyou diqu</i>	自由地區	Free region
Zhang Rui-zhen <i>Zuguo</i>	祖國	Motherland

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¹ These principles are nationalism (*minzu zhuyi*, self-determination of Chinese people); democracy (*minquan zhuyi*, rights of the people); and socialism (*minsheng zhuyi*, people's livelihood). These principles were developed by Sun Yat-sen (*The Three Principles of the People*, n.d.).

² The CCP also called Nationalists *fei*, with Chiang Kai-shek branded as "bandit Chiang" (*jiang fei*) and his troops *feijun*.

³ The Red Army was changed to the People's Liberation Army (PLA) after World War II.

⁴ This conclusion is based on the first author's visit, in June, 2013, to the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, where Chiang's diaries are preserved.

⁵ The PRC adopts a practice similar to naming ROC. Even today, they enclose ROC's governmental units in quotation marks to denote their illegitimacy.

⁶ Legal codes are from *Laws and Regulations Database of the Republic of China* (<http://law.moj.gov.tw/index.aspx>).

⁷ *United Daily News* (UDN, 聯合報), though privately owned, was founded in 1951 by mainlanders and core members of the KMT. From roughly 1959 to a few years after martial law ended in 1987, it was considered one of the most influential newspapers in Taiwan. The UDN database has a comprehensive archive of news articles, including UDN newspapers published in Taiwan since September 16, 1951, as well as articles published by subsidiary newspapers and magazines, from varying periods. Since restrictions on Taiwan's media and publications were not removed until after 1987, the stance taken by UDN basically reflected Taiwan's official position and dominant discourse, with competing voices correspondingly weakened. Here we focus on the *United Daily News* as an index to Taiwan's political discourse.

⁸ Readers should be cautioned against over-interpreting these figures, since each word's meaning can only be examined against the text itself, an impossible task given the size of the data set. Moreover, words are combined with different words to form unique semantic units and cannot be subjected to standardized treatments. Suffice it to say that *gongfei* may appear in texts that treat the CCP as a ferocious enemy, or in the context of light-hearted, nostalgic contemplations, among many other possibilities.

⁹ We refer to selected examples from the texts of National Day, New Year's Day, inaugural, and other official speeches to examine naming practices by six presidents from 1949 forward: from 1949 to 1974 by Chiang Kai-shek; from 1975-1977, Yen Chia-kan; from 1978-1987, Chiang Ching-kuo; from 1988-1999, Lee Teng-hui; from 2000-2007, Chen Shui-bian; and from 2008 to the present, Ma Ying-jeou. Speeches by Chiang Kai-shek were downloaded from <http://chungcheng.org.tw/thought/default.htm>. Speeches by Yen, Chiang Ching-kuo, and Lee for 1988-1992, 1997, and 1999-2000 were downloaded from udndata.com and the earlier version of ROC's Presidential Office official site from http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/docset/listC.php4?_section=4. Speeches by Lee for 1993-1996, and 1998 were derived from five volumes of the book, *Collections of Mr. Lee Teng-hui's Discourse* (volumes 12, 14, 16, 18, and 20, all published in 2000). Speeches by Chen were downloaded from the ROC Presidential Office's website, http://www.President.gov.tw/php-bin/docset/listC.php4?_section=4, and select English versions from http://www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/dore2+/listE.php4?_section=5&_path=../prez. Speeches by Ma and their English versions were downloaded from the current ROC Presidential Office's website, <http://www.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=131&itemid=15418&rmid=514&word1=國慶> and from <http://www.president.gov.tw/>

¹⁰ http://www.chungcheng.org.tw/photo/pic_history.htm and <http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/中國青年救國團> [accessed 5/30/2010].

¹¹ "Anti-Communist and Fight Against Russia Slogan," article posted by "Young Bruce" on a Yahoo! blog. Accessed July 29, 2011 from <http://tw.myblog.yahoo.com/jw!Ne0.jpyFGRLsTJ5shdsQwkoFEQ--/article?mid=1431>

¹² "Ethnic group" refers to Han people.

¹³ "Ethnic literature" (*minzu wenxue*) does not refer to local Taiwanese literature. Rather, it refers to literature of the Han.

¹⁴ The practice became problematic in the 1990s when people were allowed to visit China, and the Veterans Affairs Commission of the Executive Yuan helped pay the expenses to remove such marks on 173 old soldiers (Yang Pei-ling, 1996).

¹⁵ Based on meeting records found in *Academia Historica* in Taipei.

¹⁶ ROC was one of the states that founded the United Nations in 1945.

¹⁷ <http://zh.wikisource.org/zh-hant/中華民國退出聯合國告全國同胞書> [accessed 03/31/2012].

¹⁸ Chiang gave shorter speeches, with *fei* appearing in only seven out of ten instances, and only one to four times per speech.

¹⁹ Analysis based on texts of individual speeches retrieved from <http://www.udndata.com>

²⁰ *Kinmen* (or *Jinmen*, Quemoy) is a group of islands off the coast of Fujian Province on the mainland. It had been ROC's "frontier" (*qianxian*) military base during the anti-Communist period, given its proximity to, and strategic positioning toward, the Chinese mainland. The 823 Artillery War in 1958 was one among the several important battles on Quemoy. That the famous eight-character phrase, "Unifying China by the Three Principles of the People," was placed in large characters on a mountainside facing China testifies to its role in fighting against the Communists. It was not until 1992 that martial law was lifted in Quemoy and residents of Taiwan were allowed to visit.

²¹ See footnote 30.

²² Democratization of Taiwan no longer allowed ROC to claim to represent all of China, since the government had to draw its authority from the electorate (Yahuda, 1996).

²³ Commonly referred as *luweihui*, the Council was established in 1991 to handle matters concerning China in the wake of ROC allowing people to visit China in 1987 (retrieved July 17, 2011 from <http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=44064&CtNode=5957&mp=1>). Note the reference to China as "the mainland." In 1991, the ROC government shut down the Council on Recovering and Planning the Mainland, established in 1954. All these ROC units dealing with China are/were titled *dalü*; more detailed discussion of *dalü* is in chapter four.

²⁴ *Huaborong* is a nickname, hence we make no distinction between first and second names.

²⁵ The phrases *dalumei* and *touduke* are both surfeit with implications. Since an open-door policy was adopted in the late 1980s, many Taiwanese males married mainland women. In addition, mainland women have worked as prostitutes in Taiwan. As a result, mainland Chinese women are sometimes derogated as "*dalü* (mainland) *mei* (younger sister)." As for *touduke* (illegal immigrant)—*toudu* (aboard without permission); and *ke* (guest)—these refer to situations where mainland people try to migrate to Taiwan without permission.

²⁶ Based on a search conducted July 22, 2011 at *Liberty Times* online (<http://iservice.libertytimes.com.tw/IService2/search.php>), using *gongfei* as keyword, from November 1 through 30, 2008.

²⁷ Based on a search conducted on July 22, 2011, in the UDN database (<http://www.udndata.com/>) using *gongfei* as keyword, from November 1 to 30, 2008.

²⁸ The Chungli [zhongli] Incident occurred in 1977, when thousands of people surrounded and burned a police station to protest KMT fraud in a local election for Taoyuan County. The riot killed two people, the votes were recounted and the non-KMT candidate won. The incident was considered the first demonstration by Taiwanese against the Nationalist government, facilitating the gradual formation of coalitions among those against the KMT (*dangwai*, "outside the party").