

SYMBOLS IN CONFLICT: TAIWAN (TAIWAN) AND ZHONGGUO (CHINA) IN TAIWAN'S IDENTITY POLITICS

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This study analyzes how symbols taiwan (Taiwan) and zhongguo (China) have helped construct changing Taiwanese identity since the Nationalists assumed control of Taiwan in 1949. While in the past zhongguo subsumed taiwan, rising Taiwanese consciousness has compelled a reversal of their center–border positioning. Taiwan has moved from being a taboo term to cause for celebration, whereas the once dominant zhongguo has been rendered less visible through acts of de-Sinicization. The ROC government has also adopted creative rhetoric to reinvent the One China Policy implied by its Constitution. Taiwanese national identities are thus reconstituted in the ongoing negotiation of boundaries between Taiwanese-ness and Chinese-ness.

Introduction

Are people in Taiwan *taiwanren* (Taiwanese), *zhongguoren* (Chinese), or both? In Taiwan the seemingly innocent question, “Are you a *zhongguoren*?” might get an enthusiastic “yes,” a resistant “no,” or a non-committal “perhaps,” even though most people in Taiwan who answer might claim the same ethnic ancestry—that is, they are the descendants of Chinese.¹ No less complex emotions may be aroused when the question is changed to, “Are you a *taiwanren*?” Just recently, controversy has erupted concerning a claim made by the official tour guidebook, *Inside Taipei Guide*, sponsored by the Taipei city government, to the effect that second-generation late Chinese immigrants might feel uncomfortable when they are called *taiwanren*.

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While some believe *zhongguoren* is a broader category of which *taiwanren* is merely a subset, others view the two terms as conceptually equivalent and hence interchangeable. Still others treat these two labels as occupying different, mutually exclusive spaces. The variance, inconsistency and changeability in such positions registers complex interconnections of culture, ethnicity, and politics, amidst increasing awareness of being Taiwanese and the corresponding struggle to find national identity.

Efforts by some to banish terms such as *zhongguo*, *zhonghua*, and *zhongguoren* from Taiwan's political discourse and replace them with words such as *taiwan* and *taiwanren* adds further complications to the already labyrinthine Taiwanese political landscape. Rising local consciousness over the Nationalist government's early indoctrination of people in Taiwan as *zhongguoren*, together with China's continuing threats and claims to already own Taiwan, have led to the desire of some Taiwanese to de-Sinicize themselves. Choosing to downplay the impact of China and things Chinese and to label themselves as *taiwanren*, they try to construct a new identity by distancing themselves from a common cultural heritage. These symbols in conflict—*Taiwanese* versus *Chinese*—are another chapter in Taiwan's rocky history and its quest to define its identity vis-à-vis China.

Although naming practices are an important part of Chinese culture,² *zhongguoren* and *taiwanren*, much like *zhongguo* and *taiwan*, are not merely descriptors but symbols³ that help construct political realities. Their meanings are the products of negotiation among interweaving strains of political ideologies, as they compete for domination through various forms of manipulation.⁴ With the rise in Taiwanese consciousness (*taiwan yishi*, exemplified by the promotion of indigenous culture and languages) and sociopolitical changes in recent years,⁵ Taiwanese identity projects⁶ have come to the forefront and the long taken-for-granted label *zhongguo* is now critically scrutinized.

This article analyzes how these two sets of symbols have struggled to define and construct Taiwanese identity since the Nationalists retreated to Taiwan in 1949.⁷ In an expansion from primordial ties⁸ such as ethnicity and cultural heritage as their bases, construction of Taiwanese identities must also respond to sociopolitical contexts that entail both effective and practical considerations under China's continual threat.⁹ Geertz's position that

the tension between these two powerful motives—the need to be recognized and the demand for effective political order to realize collective aims—characterizes the struggle of new states¹⁰ and is played out uniquely in the formation of Taiwan's national identity.

Taiwan and *zhongguo* have gradually reversed their center-border positioning.¹¹ In the midst of a variety of constraints—such as history, reconfiguration of Taiwan and China on the international stage, roles played by the United States and Japan, state institutions' manipulation, cultural and economic resources, and so on—*taiwan* has “cascaded”¹² from being a taboo term to a symbol of celebration, and *zhongguo* from being the dominant symbol to being problematized. The shift of Taiwanese identity responds to powerful social and political forces while at the same time remaining grounded and constrained by ethnicity and history. At times overlapping and susceptible to unstable boundaries, these multifaceted symbols are intimately connected, and their reconfiguration helps implement new ideas and reconstruct alternative political realities for Taiwan.

Reversing Border and Center: *Taiwan*, from Subordination to Elevation

While the symbols *zhongguo* and *zhongguoren* have attracted much scholarly attention,¹³ comparatively few have addressed what the name *taiwan* stands for and the symbolic power it may possess. This seeming imbalance is quite in line with political reality. *Zhongguo* asserts its forcefulness and domination through its role as symbol of China, the country with the world's largest population and status as one of the permanent United Nations Security Council members. *Zhongguo* is represented by the People's Republic of China, and prior to 1971, was represented by the Republic of China. *Taiwan*, on the other hand, has occupied a comparatively minor position. Domestically, it has long been constructed by the ROC government as merely a province of China, whereas internationally, it stands for the locality of an island and a state whose name cannot be recognized and which must remain an invisible actor.¹⁴ Taiwanese consciousness continues to rise, from its early status as a nearly unutterable term to being elevated to the level of national symbol.

“Taiwan,” An Unutterable Term

Since the Nationalists took over Taiwan in 1945 and until martial law was lifted in 1987, *taiwan* had been used to name a locality where people live and make a living, but not necessarily a place with which to identify oneself. This was especially true during the Nationalists' early rulership, when Taiwan served primarily as a base from which the government intended to launch its campaign to recover the mainland.

When Taiwan was restored from Japanese occupation to the Nationalist government, the Taiwanese activated a mother complex, eagerly welcoming the arrival of the central government from China.¹⁵ Since the Taiwanese had been under Japan's rule and were socialized to accept that they were not yet ready to govern themselves,¹⁶ the idea of one day returning to the bosom of the great Chinese motherland seemed irresistible. The “Orphan of Asia” metaphor proposed in 1945¹⁷ effectively summarizes the confusion and struggle of those in Taiwan—whether they were Japanese, Chinese, or Taiwanese—over their identity under Japanese occupation. Here the orphan image and its derivative motherland image collaborate in expressing the racial and ethnic connection between being Taiwanese and being Chinese. The symbol *zhongguo*, officially imposed by the Nationalist government, was eagerly supported by people celebrating the end of Japanese colonial rule.

Unfortunately, the sense of abandonment inherent in the metaphor “Orphan of Asia” was exacerbated. On the one hand, different cultural and historical experiences made the encounter between people in Taiwan and KMT troops problematic; as Phillips puts it, “the retrocession was less the restoration of historical ties than the attempt to forge an entirely new relationship.”¹⁸ On the other hand, the eagerness to return to the embrace of the Chinese motherland was soon met with consternation and dismay due to widespread incompetence, bribery, and illegal behavior by various government officials. The sense of abandonment was tragically realized in the massacre of people in Taiwan on 28 February 1947¹⁹ and the ushering in of the era of “the white terror” leading to the attendant diminution of the image of a Chinese motherland.²⁰ Jacobs notes, “It was only after February

28, 1947, that the concept of 'Taiwan independence' . . . became an important force."^{21,22}

The majority of local residents of Taiwan—early Chinese immigrants who migrated primarily in the 17th century—were ruled by the Japanese prior to the arrival of the Nationalists. These *taiwanren* were often portrayed by the government as less cultured and educated, uninformed about the grandeur of Chinese culture.²³ Chen I, the governor assigned by KMT, said that since people in Taiwan were “enslaved” by the Japanese they had the minds of slaves and therefore needed to be re-Sinicized before acquiring full political rights.²⁴ This positioning is paradoxical, as the islanders were required to be reacculturated to their Chinese roots, which they were said to have already shared with late Chinese immigrants. Primordial variables, in the early encounter between local residents and Chiang's troops, were at the same time a temporarily disrupted given and a construction shaping the contents of Taiwanese identification.

Geertz notes, “To an increasing degree national unity is maintained not by calls to blood and land but by a vague, intermittent, and routine allegiance to a civil state, supplemented to a greater or lesser extent by governmental use of police powers and ideological exhortation.”²⁵ In the case of Taiwan, the configuration is different: aside from calling for allegiance to the Republic of China, the Nationalist government's advocacy has also been based upon local residents' blood connections with late Chinese immigrants and people in China, and upon the land—the mainland. However, local residents of Taiwan have cultivated different customs and lived in different regions despite their blood connections, and at that time had never seen the mainland.

The Nationalist government's efforts to promote *zhong-guo* and minimize the significance of *taiwan* define Taiwanese identity—after being treated as second-class citizens by the Japanese, some seemed to feel the same at the hands by the Nationalist government.²⁶ Assimilation was expected of the majority of Taiwanese residents. An incipient Taiwanese consciousness, initially developed as an expression of Chinese national sentiment against Japanese colonialism,²⁷ now had to be left on its own. As the government continued its advocacy of Taiwan as true heir to

authentic Chinese culture, the original high hopes of some local residents concerning the Chinese motherland started to crumble and Taiwanese consciousness began to assume a more concrete shape.²⁸

Chiang Kai-shek ruled the island from 1950 to 1975. He viewed the Republic of China as the only legitimate Chinese country and the People's Republic of China, the state established by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as an illegitimate, traitorous "nest of bandits."²⁹ Hence, he firmly rejected the possibility of "two Chinas," a policy that could be translated as "one China and one Taiwan." For Chiang, such a policy amounted to the legitimization of the aggressive actions of Russia and its alleged puppet, the CCP, thus violating the principle that "Han People and Thieves Do Not Stand on the Same Ground" (*han zei bu liang li*, or 漢賊不兩立). "One China," from the Nationalists' perspective, was the Republic of China. The Han people, or "descendants of the dragon," should never be divided.

This line of rhetoric survived even after the split between China and Russia, as Chiang positioned his Nationalist government as a vehement anti-Communist regime during the Cold War era when the whole world seemed divided between anti-Communism and Communism.³⁰ The ROC's representation of China also helped garner support from the United States and other anti-Communist countries. Domestically, this rhetoric also helped legitimize the governmental structure serving the interests of the claim of a small ruling minority to represent the entire Chinese mainland.³¹ Taking upon itself the role as the only political party capable of saving *zhongguo*, and reflecting a concern that an independent Taiwan republic would lessen its legitimacy and consequently its political dominance of Taiwan,³² the Nationalist government discouraged any hint of Taiwanese national identity. The restriction of political participation and democratization in Taiwan was also made legitimate on the grounds that the government must protect national security and guard against the Communist threat.

The entrenched ideology of the time forbade statements about Taiwan's independence, treating their authors as seditious and poisonous Communist collaborators. Such people were thought eligible for criminal prosecution for treason,³³ with many political dissidents forced to live overseas, returning to Taiwan

only after martial law was lifted in 1987. The political slogan “*Taiwan's independence is Taiwan's poison*” (*taidu jiushi taidu*, or 台獨就是台毒), a catch phrase played out on the basis of Chinese homophones (“independence,” and “poison” both share the same sound, *du*), aided in implementing this political ideology. These words, carved in stone, can still be found on the offshore Green Island, the place where political dissidents were jailed and executed during the Chiangs' rulership.

Advocating for Taiwanese self-governance outside the auspices of the Nationalists was viewed as tantamount to calling for Taiwan's independence. Such a challenge to the legitimacy of the One China policy was seen as weakening the link between Taiwan and China and hence was also intolerable.³⁴ The name *taiwan* could not, upon pain of severe political sanctions, be uttered in the public sphere as a label of national identity. *Taiwan* was marked not only by its locality, but also by its temporality.

Thus even after The Republic of China (ROC) was expelled from the United Nations in 1972, alternative voices advocating a “multiple-system state” or “one country, two governments” still failed to change the China-centered rhetoric,³⁵ rhetoric of the kind Roy has described as having a spiritual, quasi-religious character.³⁶ Even upon encountering tremendous difficulty trying to join international organizations under the official name ROC, the government still refused to use the name *taiwan* as its national label. In 1976, when the International Olympics Committee, in response to pressure from the PRC, asked Taiwan to change its name from ROC to *taiwan*, the proposal was rejected by the ROC. The government gave up the opportunity to participate in the event rather than use the name *taiwan*.³⁷ In such actions, the state exerted its power to control the interpretation of *taiwan*, inhibiting its applicability in national discourse.

Under the powerful sway of various discourses endorsing a China-centered ideology, the word *taiwan* was rendered invisible and insignificant, serving at most as China's provincial designator. The laws governing people's associations, for example, specifically forbade using *taiwan* in their title³⁸ with *zhongguo* serving as the official designator for national organizations. Another contrast can be seen in the status of state-owned businesses. Nearly all newly established, industrialized, government-owned or -related enterprises bear the name *zhongguo*, as in China Petroleum

Company, China Shipboard-Building Company, China Airlines, and so on, not to mention privately owned businesses such as Chinese Cultural College³⁹ and *China Times*. Even the Nationalist government's party carries the name *zhongguo*—the Chinese Kuomintang (*zhongguo guomindang*). On the other hand, *taiwan* was used as a label for state-owned businesses, many of which existed long before the Nationalist government arrived in Taiwan (such as Taiwan Sugar Corporation, Taiwan Tobacco and Liquor Corporation, and so on). This China-centered historical legacy, expressed through various objects and fortified by official interpretations of key issues at problematic times, embodies specific principles and values.⁴⁰

Aside from politics, the state's power also entered into the cultural domain. As a symbol, *taiwan*'s status was further lowered with the promotion of Mandarin Chinese, reducing the significance of local dialects, long recognized as important sources for building national identity. Under the auspices of the Committee for Promotion of Mandarin Chinese of Taiwan Province (*taiwan-sheng guoyu tuixing weiyuanhui*), established in 1946, Taiwanese dialects were not allowed in public spheres such as schools, government, the military, and so on, and permitted only very limited exposure in media.⁴¹ Even the selection of government officials was based in large part on candidates' familiarity with Mandarin Chinese.⁴² As the ethnolinguistic vitality⁴³ of Taiwanese dialects continued to decline, so the pride associated with Taiwanese cultures became increasingly fragile. The situation continued until after martial law was lifted in the late 1980s, when, in response to rising Taiwanese consciousness, nativistic education started to focus on preserving various mother tongues and cultures.

Purportedly to avoid Communist infiltration, the government also implemented martial law forbidding freedom of speech, press, and assembly, activities that might have sustained the vitality of local culture. Accompanying this legalistic ideology was the loss of history, language, and voice, cultural expressions of Taiwan.⁴⁴ People who lived in Taiwan were *zhongguoren*, and *taiwanren* designated a specific ethnic group and its culture. *Taiwanren* were on the one hand *zhongguoren*, and on the other hand, in the process of becoming *zhongguoren*. Their familiar identification with Taiwanese culture, language, social customs, and so on, were made subordinate to a generalized commitment to an

overarching civic order branded as *zhongguo*. Geertz's analysis fits Taiwan well: taking such action "is to risk a loss of definition as an autonomous person, either through absorption into a culturally undifferentiated mass, or, what is even worse, through domination by some other rival ethnic, racial, or linguistic community that is able to imbue that order with the temper of its own personality."⁴⁵

Given the Nationalist government's strong advocacy of the "grand China consciousness" (*dazhongguo yishi*, or 大中國意識) and its conception of Taiwan as a temporary base, the symbol *taiwan* became only a part, often awkwardly placed, in the grand Chinese cultural scheme. As Wang and Liu put it, the government "considers the word 'China' a term representing a culture, a nation, and a state. To be Chinese involves not only belonging to Chinese culture but also political inclusion in a Chinese state known as *Zhongguo*."⁴⁶ Under such a scheme, Taiwan manifests itself as a geographical location, but not a nation; it reflects physical reality, but not necessarily national identification. Taiwanese identity must be defined through the lens of "Chinese-ness." In such a political ideology, *taiwan* becomes a means to an end, a phase to be endured in the passage to a better place. While the question, "Where are you from?" can be answered with a simple "Taiwan" to indicate the locale, ironically, answers to the question of "Which country do you come from?" could *not* contain the word *taiwan*.

The connotative meanings of the symbol *taiwan* develop out of the manifold complexities of Chinese polity as enriched through this unique historicity. Its meanings had to be restricted to be in line with the then dominant political ideology. However, all these discriminatory measures, depriving people of the opportunity to identify themselves with primordial ties in order to foster a Chinese identity, provoked resentment among some of Taiwan's residents, who perceived the KMT government as an occupying force and a foreign regime.⁴⁷ Some, finding it difficult to proclaim their love for Taiwan, over time gradually found outlets to express their emotions. *Loudly Claim that You Love Taiwan*⁴⁸ is the title of a book by Shuang-bu Lin, published at a time when such sentiments incurred great political risk. A theme song for an underground radio station titled "Our Mother is Called Taiwan"⁴⁹ has as its lyrics, in Taiwanese dialect, the following:

Mother is mountain, mother is ocean, mother is river, Mother's name is Taiwan.

Mother is conscience, mother is righteous, Mother is the spring for you and me,

Two million children of the sweet potato⁵⁰ dare not call the name of their mother.

Is 'Taiwan' that ugly a name? It makes me so chilled in my heart.

...

Two million children of the sweet potato cannot call the name of their mother.

Like a mute who is pressured to death. It breaks my heart.

Two million children of the sweet potato, please don't keep silent.

Bravely mention your Mother's name.

Taiwan! Taiwan! You are the name of Mother.⁵¹

This song carries the sense of sorrowfulness (*beiqing yishi*, or 悲情意識), registering the sadness and helplessness of Taiwanese at never having been able to rule themselves and control their own destiny.⁵² Their identities had to be reinvented according to different rulers and political ideologies. During Japanese rule, they were constructed as second-class Japanese citizens; with the return to the Chinese government, however, they were portrayed as having to be re-enculturated as Chinese. Taiwanese self-reflexivity, according to Tu, entails

the sense of rejection, oppression, marginalization, loss and disorientation... Taiwanese consciousness emerged out of confusion, frustration, anger and grief, as well as out of the courage to confront the unknown and the wisdom to manage the unpredictable.⁵³

As the government continued its rhetorical campaign to establish that the motherland is the *China* yet to be realized, the symbol *taiwan* continued to languish. Even though the passing years saw the government lessening in its zeal to recover the mainland, the image *zhongguo* has nevertheless gradually claimed an important space in the Taiwanese psyche. At the same time, although a Taiwanese consciousness was not allowed expression externally, internally it has continued to grow. *Taiwan*, as the symbol of national identity, remains nascent.

"Taiwan," A Cause for Celebration

The discourse that centralizes *zhongguo* as the focal point of Taiwan's destiny has had to yield to the current upsurge in

emphasis on local consciousness in which the term *taiwan* is celebrated on many occasions and capitalized upon by various political parties. In terms of economics, the "Taiwan miracle" of the late 1980s fostered a new sense of identity.⁵⁴ In terms of domestic politics, it became increasingly obvious that the ROC government would not be able to "recover" the Chinese mainland and the government would have to open up to local residents. The ongoing democratization, such as the lifting of martial law in 1987, initiated by Chiang-Ching Kuo (Chiang Kai-Shek's son) and extended by Lee Teng-hui, permitted political discourse on Taiwan's national identification to appear in public. In 1991, *Guidelines for National Unification* was implemented, on the one hand, endorsing the One China policy, while on the other hand, admitting that the ROC government has no control over the Chinese mainland.

Internal voices dissenting from the KMT's authority have become stronger. Among the types of freedom sought by people in Taiwan is the freedom to talk about Taiwan's independence without incurring charges of violating the "civil strife crime" stipulated by Criminal Law Code Article 100. In the late 1980s, even after martial law was lifted, several people (most notably You-quan Cai, Cao-de Xu, and Nan-rong Zheng) were charged under the statute for making statements about Taiwan's independence. This led to various forms of protest, including Nan-rong Zheng burning himself to death to protest the government's control. Eventually, Article 100 was revised in 1992, giving people the freedom to articulate ideas concerning Taiwan's future (in whatever direction). Once forbidden, the discourse on Taiwan's identification—and possible independence—finally opened up to public engagement and the issues were even debated in scholarly discussions at conferences.⁵⁵ Simply put, since 1992, "Taiwan's independence" is no longer "Taiwan's poison."

Externally, the contact now allowed with the PRC, though on the one hand leading to expectations of more business opportunities, also leads some Taiwanese to be disillusioned with the idea of being unified with China. The romanticized motherland has been transformed into a disenchanting marketplace.⁵⁶ Moreover, as China continues to contest Taiwan's claim as an independent sovereign entity, it stimulates *taiwan* to search for a heightened

sense of identity, prompting cultural entrepreneurs/political leaders to offer *taiwan* as a new identity category.⁵⁷ However, the economic and political connections between the two are still difficult to disentangle; *taiwan* as a cause for celebration is also pulled between two opposite poles—being fortified by China’s military threat, and being weakened by China’s economic inducements.⁵⁸

Chao characterizes new-found Taiwanese identity as emphasizing individualism; embracing local values and indigenization; and increasingly identifying with Taiwan as an independent political community. At the 1996 Conference on National Development, the “Taiwan first” principle was agreed to by the major political parties.⁵⁹ Despite internal dissent, democratization since the 1990s has made self-determination—in both domestic and international status—a key aspect of Taiwan’s energetic civil society.⁶⁰

As times have changed, the semantic contents of *taiwan* have been modified and expanded. With rising Taiwanese consciousness and the urge by some to separate *taiwan* from *zhong-guo*—whether an idealized China, the People’s Republic of China, or to a much lesser extent, the Republic of China—for some, *taiwan* has become the preferred symbol. Regardless of whether people support Taiwan’s independence as a political aim, mentioning, referring to, and identifying oneself with *taiwan* have gradually claimed a greater share of Taiwanese political discourse. Today, very few in Taiwan continue to subscribe to Nationalist government’s greater Chinese nationalism.

The “freezing” of Taiwan province in 1997 through revising the ROC Constitution under the leadership of former president Lee is another major step in the move toward establishing the legitimacy of Taiwan as an independent state. Such actions are depicted as helping save resources and achieve efficiency by not having two overlapping central governments (the central government for ROC and the government of Taiwan province).⁶¹ Symbolically, once “Taiwan province” no longer exists, Taiwan will be able to claim the status of a central government and the tie between China and Taiwan can also be severed.⁶² In 2006, under Chen’s guidance, and in spite of objections, *Guidelines for National Unification* simply “ceased.” Since unification with China is at least temporarily no longer the official goal, Taiwan is free to make its own choice.

Taiwan has developed into a focus of its own to induce identity change, and has become a convenient label for a new civic order to promote self-determination, aided by the image of *taiwan* as “mother.” “Taiwan, my Mother” (*taiwan wode muqin*, or 台灣, 我的母親) has become a popular expression, used particularly by pan-green supporters.⁶³ It is the title of a book;⁶⁴ a portion of the title of an article;⁶⁵ part of numerous pledges and slogans chanted during election campaigns by candidates; and included in national speeches delivered by President Chen. In his 2000 victory speech, for example, Chen concluded with these words: “May Heaven bless Taiwanese people, may Heaven bless Taiwan—our forever Mother!”⁶⁶

Focusing on the metaphorical implications of the nurturing and loving qualities of the mother, such an image instills *taiwan* with the attributes of warmth, loving care, and firmness. However, the image of maternity is also one of fierce defensiveness.⁶⁷ *Taiwan* is seen as a nurturing and protective mother who will help her people eventually develop into fully fledged members of international society.

Taiwan-centered discourse has permeated all aspects of Taiwanese life. Phrases such as “adore and cherish Taiwan” (*tengxi taiwan*, or 疼惜台灣), “stand by and protect Taiwan” (*shouhu taiwan*, or 守護台灣), and “identify with Taiwan” (*rengtong taiwan*, or 認同台灣) can also be widely seen and heard. The word *taiwan* has itself become a key political symbol reflecting rising local consciousness, especially under the auspices of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party and President Chen, since his election in 2000, as well as its ally, the Taiwan Solidarity Union. Examples abound: Taiwan's passports, from having “Issued in Taiwan” on the front cover in 2002, have displayed only the word *taiwan* under its *ROC* title since 2003; President Chen has moved from stating that the shortened name for Taiwan is *taiwan* to the position that Taiwan's name should be simply, *taiwan*; the Double Tenth Celebration uses *taiwan* instead of *ROC* in the board decorating the outside of the Presidential Hall; and the *ROC Yearbook* began to co-list both *ROC* and *taiwan* in its title in the 2002 edition, and changed to *Taiwan Yearbook* from its 2003 edition onward.⁶⁸ Since August 2005, the designation “(Taiwan)” appears next to the official presidential website's title, “Republic of China.”

A dramatic indicator of these trends occurred on 9 May 2003, in a letter published in the *Washington Post* asking that Taiwan be allowed to join the World Health Organization's fight against SARS. In that letter, President Chen consistently refers to the country as *taiwan*, as in the statement, "As Taiwan's democratically elected president, my first and foremost obligation is to the people of Taiwan," and the term *taiwan* appears 22 times. In this letter, Chen also did not use Taiwan's official title, the Republic of China. Designation of the article's author is simply, "The Writer is President of Taiwan."⁶⁹ As another example, in the 2006 New Year's Day speech, Chen used the phrase *taiwan* a record number of 64 times.⁷⁰

Taiwan has become for some the name of a country in the here and now, rather than simply a name for a locality, or a dream or future hope. This Taiwan-centeredness also redefines the meaning of *taiwanren*. No longer a designator exclusively for early Chinese immigrants from Fukien, the term has for some begun to replace *zhongguoren* to represent *all* people living in Taiwan. Nevertheless, since the term has in the past been used to refer to a specific group, for some the appropriateness of using it to represent everyone (including *Hakka* and various tribes of aboriginals, in addition to late Chinese immigrants) has become hegemonic and the subject of fierce debates.

Just as *taiwan* is increasingly advocated as the motherland, the "Chinese mainland" or *zhongguo*, long endorsed by state institutions, is gradually losing its stronghold, particularly since it no longer has the support of official institutions. While S.-b. Lin's call for people to "Loudly Claim that [I] Love Taiwan" is an early attempt to fashion *taiwan* as a national symbol, invoking many contending voices, such calls have become common, and even politically correct. The symbol *taiwan*, whether it designates a place or its people, represents something that must be nurtured and cared for. As the lyrics of the song, "She is Our Baby," composed by Ming-zhang Chen and sung for the massive 228 Hand-in-Hand Rally held on 28 February 2004, puts it,

A flower grows from the ground, she is cherished most by her father and mother.

If the wind blows, be sure to cover her with a blanket and never let her fall to the dark.

Before the flower blossoms, she needs the care of you and me.

Give her good earth to grow.
 Let's hold our hands, and let our hearts be connected—we are all
 together.
 She is our baby.

“She,”⁷¹ of course, is Taiwan, an identity still in need of further cultivation and development. The flower might blossom if proper care is taken toward its growth. From the earlier notion of *taiwan* as an orphan desperately searching for but unable to find its parents, here *taiwan* is the child—or newborn life—yet to be nurtured. *Taiwan* is at the same time a mother caring for its inhabitants and a child who requires nurturance from its people.

The 228 Hand-in-Hand Rally recruited more than two million people to form a human chain to protest the threat from China's missiles and to affirm Taiwan's political identity as different from China. Extending from the north at Hoping Island near Keelung and ending at Changlong in Jiadong township, Pingdong County, this stretch of the world's longest (500 kilometer) human chain was declared by President Chen as “the democratic great wall.”⁷² It was a significant moment in Taiwan's history, during which the symbol *taiwan* reached perhaps its highest point yet.

Interestingly, however, in 2004, after the controversial presidential election, former legislator Shen Fu-xiong called for abandoning discourse on “loving Taiwan” because it has become a political tool of division and exploitation (that is, it can be assumed that people who claim to “love Taiwan” are true Taiwanese, and those who do not so swear are China's cohorts). Shen's call generated a great deal of argument.⁷³ A simple dichotomy between *taiwan* and *zhongguo*, while conducive to political identification, masks their complex, multi-layered relationships. Insisting on the primacy of a given concept also essentializes it and denies the fact of multiple belongings of people; once forced, they could colonize individuals under a specific category.⁷⁴ *Taiwan* as a symbol for national identity must continue negotiating its position by delineating its entangled relation with *zhongguo*.

Reversing Border and Center: Minimizing *Zhongguo* and *Zhongguoren*

As *taiwan* continues to gain in prominence, its counterparts *zhongguo* and *zhongguoren* have also been compelled to change

their configuration. Once a dominant symbol sustaining Taiwan's political ideology, *zhongguo* now has to face the challenges of de-Sinicization. This development is also predicated on the tension between interdependence and separation between Taiwan and China. While Taiwan's current extensive economic exchanges and shared cultural lineage with the PRC help build intimate ties, they do not prevent divergent developments of their discordant political cultures, which are stagnating and even retrenching.⁷⁵ Cultural and political identifications with *zhongguo* are only inconsistently related; while people in Taiwan are often compelled to choose sides, the fact that they belong to multiple, rather than single, realities has made their identity projects multi-dimensional tasks. Evolving and traversing through Chinese history, this polysemous term has become heavily laden with political, sociocultural, and geographical implications.

As for use of, and reactions to, the term by contemporary Taiwanese, it is as if one has opened a Pandora's box. Some treat *zhongguo* as synonymous with, and exclusive to, the People's Republic of China, while others find the term equally applicable to both Taiwan and the PRC. Some view *zhongguo* as a future state of becoming that could realize all the ideal qualities of a nation of Han people; others believe *zhongguo* already exists, regardless of whether it is the *zhongguo* of the mainland or of Taiwan. Some think *zhongguo* represents great accomplishments of human civilization; others treat it as reflecting a set of common cultural practices. *Zhongguo* may represent an ideal state, or an ideal country that presumably embraces all Han people.⁷⁶ It may also represent anything that emerges from the Chinese mainland, including the PRC as well as the ROC. Both designations contain the word *zhongguo* in their title. For some, it is merely an ethnic and cultural label, while for others it is a symbol of political allegiance and a marker of national identity.

While meanings of *zhongguo* remain multivocal, the divergence of *taiwan* from *zhongguo* and things Chinese ensues in the continual struggle between political and cultural Chinese-ness. For those supportive of such movements, this process entails comprehensive action at various levels. Concrete steps include, most notably, rectification of names, replacing *zhongguo* with *taiwan* in a variety of expressions in the hope of developing a new Taiwanese culture. In addition, the DPP-led government has had

to invent creative rhetoric to redefine the meaning of *zhongguo* contained in the ROC Constitution, so that it will not hinder *taiwan*'s self-assertion.

Departure from China and Things Chinese

Earlier we noted that the freezing of Taiwan province and ever-increasing Taiwanese cultural activities provide major impetus for the legitimacy of Taiwan as an independent state. Although the Chinese mainland has long been a referent for Taiwan's self-identity, democratization in modern Taiwan has led many to insist that its fate must not to be defined by "otherness." As Sino-centrism comes to be seen as associated with neo-traditional, conservative, and conformist ideology—seemingly outdated social principles of the past decade—it has become a *de facto* discourse opposing Taiwan's nativization, characterized by the coexistence of globalism and localism. As Tu argues, "Taiwanese authenticity inevitably clashes with Chinese identity"⁷⁷ and a new Taiwanese cultural identity implies the precondition of de-Sinicization.

This opposition, however, does not deny the fact that the majority of people in Taiwan admit their common cultural heritage with China. While most people in Taiwan see their Taiwanese identities as distinct from Chinese identities, they do not deny their Chinese cultural and ethnic heritage.⁷⁸ This may explain why efforts to de-Sinicize arouse a great deal of debate, since the political and cultural connotations of *zhongguo* cannot be easily differentiated. While the implications of de-Sinicization for an independent Taiwanese political identity seem clear, its implications for culture are less obvious: although modernism is seen as standing in opposition to Sino-centrism, and hence the need to depart from the Sinic world, the common cultural heritage admitted by people in Taiwan remains connected.

Through various forms of discourse, current DPP-controlled governmental actions aim at elevating *taiwan* while downplaying *zhongguo*. Public examinations that select government officials and certify qualification in various specialties now involve endless arguments about whether the subject matter "National History" should include only histories of Taiwan, or histories of both Taiwan and China, as well as whether the subject, which has

long been assumed to be Chinese history, should be changed to “Taiwanese History.”

In 2004, the Ministry of Education proposed revising the high school history curriculum. National history (*benguoshi*, or 本國史), as taught in the past, included all events occurring on the Chinese mainland, leading to the ROC’s relocation to Taiwan, and its subsequent contribution in building Taiwan. Taiwan’s own history, such as its being ruled by various other countries prior to KMT governance, as well as its cultures and customs, was seldom discussed at length. The Ministry of Education suggested dividing the “National History” of the ROC into two parts: “Taiwan History” (the ROC after the Nationalist relocation to Taiwan), to be taught in the first semester; and “China History” (before the relocation), to be taught in the second semester.⁷⁹ The differential weight associated with the two symbols is clear: aside from dividing ROC’s history into the *taiwan* and *zhongguo* parts, thus confirming their distinction, the presentation order, Taiwan first and then China, emphasizes their relative positioning.

Aside from such structural issues, it is now recommended that the substance of the curriculum should also be changed to reflect a Taiwan-centered perspective, edging *zhongguo* further toward the periphery. Public examinations in history would have the majority of questions pertain to Taiwan. The National Palace Museum has also been challenged on the China-centeredness displayed in its various exhibits. Another possible revision involves rotating the map of Taiwan 90 degrees to position Taiwan at the center, as contrasted to the long-practiced depiction of Taiwan as a small island located on the southeastern side of the Chinese mainland. These seemingly small steps under the pretense of “mere clarification” actually reflect the efforts of the DPP-controlled government to render *zhongguo* more distant while moving *taiwan* to center stage, even though international political powers do not allow such a positioning.

More people in Taiwan are now comfortable saying of the people from the mainland, “they are from *zhongguo*” or “they are *zhongguoren*,” while referring to themselves as the *taiwanren* from Taiwan. In the past, the KMT encouraged people in Taiwan to think of themselves as *zhongguoren* in order to highlight a common Chinese cultural and ethnic heritage. This conception of *zhongguoren* remains deeply ingrained in people’s minds, arousing

much sentiment and patriotism. However, the DPP has long been reluctant to label people in Taiwan *zhongguoren*.⁸⁰ With the rise of local consciousness in Taiwan, even though the KMT officially endorses neither the dichotomy between *taiwan* and *zhongguo*, nor between *taiwanren* and *zhongguoren*, it has become less and less common to refer to Taiwanese people as *zhongguoren*.

Indeed, in the debate over whether one should label oneself Chinese or Taiwanese, a dichotomous perception is often invoked to serve the new ideology. Taiwanese implies pro-independence, whereas Chinese implies pro-unification.⁸¹ For some, if Taiwan is to maintain its unique Taiwanese identification, the terms *zhongguo* and *zhongguoren* should be reserved only for people of the PRC. Not surprisingly, in the 2004 presidential election one criticism directed against the defeated KMT party is that it should have changed its name from “Chinese KMT” (*zhongguo guomindang*) to “Taiwan KMT” (*taiwan guomindang*) to show its support and identification with Taiwan. At the very least, even if they had not added “Taiwan” to their title, some thought KMT should at least have removed *zhongguo*. In response to this criticism and suggestion, KMT's Strategy and Discourse Unit has been contemplating possible solutions,⁸² although to this date the name has yet to be changed. *Zhongguo* may still be too important a symbol for the party to abandon.

The DPP government sees *zhongguo* as an unwanted shadow that has followed Taiwan since Chiang Kai-shek's regime. The move to de-Sinicize—to get rid of China's impact—is, to a large extent, accomplished through a sophisticated language game that replaces the term *zhongguo* with *taiwan* in various texts. As changing political contexts have stimulated new identity projects, efforts to de-Sinicize, to apply Laitin's theory, cascade to facilitate identity change. Whenever possible, rather than putting “Taiwan” side-by-side with “China” or “the Republic of China,”⁸³ the word *taiwan* is being used to replace *zhongguo* to become the new civic order.

This trend is in line with the “rectification of names for Taiwan” (*taiwan zhengming yundong*, or 台灣正名運動), a movement encouraged and supported by both the government and some private organizations. Formally initiated in 2002, the movement has led to many political demonstrations. With the ultimate goal of granting Taiwan its name *taiwan*—that is, changing Taiwan's

official title from “Republic of China” to “Republic of Taiwan”—this movement advocates that titles of government and private organizations, and even common ways of writing, should replace the words *zhongguo* or *zhonghua* with *taiwan*.⁸⁴

With almost 50 percent of the population assumed to support these rectifications, it has now become almost “politically incorrect” to name anything that includes the terms Chinese or China. Symbols used to designate official bodies and affairs are particularly under scrutiny. State-owned enterprises such as China Petroleum Company (*zhongguo shiyou gongsi*), China Steel Company (*zhongguo gangtie gongsi*), China Shipboard-Building Company (*zhonggong zaochuan gongsi*), China Airlines (*zhonghua hangkong*), and so on, are being asked by the government to come up with strategies to change their names so as to avoid being mistaken as enterprises of the PRC. Even privately owned colleges and universities bearing the word *zhongguo* in their titles—such as Chinese Cultural University (*zhongguo wenhua daxue*)—are being asked to think about changing names.⁸⁵

There are also many other cases initiated to expel *zhongguo* from various texts. Tong-rong Cai, a DPP legislator supporting rectification, contends that the references in ROC military’s slogans to *zhongguo* or *zhongguoren* should be changed to *taiwan* or *taiwanren* instead. Patriotic songs such as “I Love the Chinese” (*woai zhonghua*, or 我愛中華) should be removed.⁸⁶ Cai and another DPP legislator, He-zi Zhuang, also asked for removal of the statement, “Be a righteous Chinese” (*zuo yige tangtangzhengzheng de zhongguoren*, 做一個堂堂正正的中國人), a slogan printed on assignment books for elementary and junior high school students and enforced since the Nationalists took control of Taiwan. With the changing society, many schools, particularly those under the jurisdiction of the DPP, have already removed the slogan, though some still retain it.⁸⁷

Even private constituencies are under pressure to administer similar kinds of “face lifts.” Many overseas Chinese organizations have had to decide about changing names. Beyond being simply a matter of personal or organizational preference, the identifier one chooses spells out the organization’s political ideology. Like it or not, choosing sides and pledging allegiance has become an important matter for many in or outside Taiwan. Laitin puts it well: “Multiple identities...can coexist within a person

only insofar as choice is not necessary. Yet when the actions or behaviors consistent with one identity conflict with those of another identity. . . people are compelled to give priority to one identity over the other."⁸⁸ Here the Confucian ethic regarding rectification of names finds one of its most appropriate and telling expressions.

However, for *taiwan* to depart from *zhongguo* and the Sinic world it represents, is no longer a simple matter. The categorical rejection of Chinese-ness through movement of de-Sinicization has aroused much opposition among people who, regardless of their political stance toward China, still identify themselves culturally with that country. The debate between *wenyanwen* (classical Mandarin) and *baihuawen* (common Mandarin) is a case in point: while one might not support unification with China, there is little reason why *wenyanwen* must be rejected just because it represents Chinese culture. For some, the claim that one must jettison classical Mandarin to mark the uniqueness of Taiwanese language and culture is to blind oneself to the fact that Taiwanese culture has its foundation in China and the impact of Chinese culture will not disappear simply because people claim it to be the case.

Aside from this culturally centered perspective, the common cultural heritage shared by people in Taiwan and China, long emphasized by the Nationalist government and endowed with associated values and principles, have legitimized the status of *zhongguo* and resisted efforts to destabilize it. While mutual exclusivity between *taiwan* and *zhongguo* seems to have grown stronger, the question of whether they do or do not overlap or subsume each other must be understood from multiple layers of connectedness, entailing issues of culture, ethnicity, and politics, as well as ideological, affective, and practical concerns.

Reinventing the One-China Policy

Perhaps one of the most challenging tasks in de-Sinicization is to reinvent the government's official position, the One-China policy implied in the ROC Constitution. Since the Nationalists moved to Taiwan in 1949, the government has always endorsed the One China Policy, even though it has been subject to alternative interpretations at different times and for different audiences.⁸⁹ One China, according to the ROC Constitution, means the

Republic of China and does not allow Taiwan to claim independent sovereignty, a thesis ironically shared by both the ROC and PRC governments.

The Constitution cannot be revised without the support of the legislature, making its alteration unlikely given that KMT continues to control the legislature even though DPP has held the presidency since 2000. Hence, despite the DPP's strong position on abandoning the One China policy, the government can only hold to the status quo while attempting to rhetorically reinvent the meaning of "One China."

In response to the demands of democracy and in recognition of Taiwan's political reality, in 1991 under former president Lee, then KMT party leader, the *Guidelines of National Unification* were implemented. In line with the ROC Constitution, *zhongguo* is used to refer to a future state, a country populated by "all Chinese." It is therefore not the same as either the PRC or the ROC, nor both added together, but depicts a political entity of a higher order. In the *Guidelines*, "the mainland area" is used to designate the PRC, and ROC is concurrently reduced to "the Taiwan area." This document translates early propaganda into legalistic language, continuing the same rhetoric but with an added sense of security and seeming rationality. Although Taiwan no longer wants to "recover" the mainland, it has yet to give up hope of being unified with a future state of China. This approach seems to mediate the gap between Chinese ethnic nationalism and Taiwanese consciousness, while at the same time satisfying both the long-held rhetoric of the ROC government and pressure from the PRC.

As Taiwan's official position endorsing the One China Policy has become a losing battle in diplomacy, the myth of that policy has begun to crumble. In the 1990s, *zhongguo* and *zhongguoren* were "increasingly regarded as irrelevant or even 'alien' to the people of Taiwan."⁹⁰ The attempt to set aside *zhongguo*—at times the Republic of China—was probably stimulated by the ROC's inability to join international organizations under its official title since 1972 when China acquired the status of the "only" legitimate Chinese nation.

Moreover, democratization of Taiwan can no longer allow it to claim to represent the whole of China, since its government must draw its authority from its electorate.⁹¹ Since 1993, former

President Lee views substance in international memberships as more important to Taiwan's title and has allowed many alternative names to be used.⁹² DPP's 1999 "Resolution on the Future of Taiwan" also endorses the same effort in getting around the One China policy by openly stating that the country would not insist upon the name ROC, but uses a variety of other designators to participate in international organizations.

As the prospect of recovering the Chinese mainland became impossible, under Lee, the One China Policy was endorsed on the principle of "equal positioning" (*duideng diwei*, or 對等地位). With the goal of emphasizing a Taiwanese identity apart from *zhongguo* without violating the ROC Constitution, Lee managed to use various creative discursive strategies to redefine and reinvent the meanings of the policy, eventually moving toward the idea of a "special state-to-state relation."⁹³

This strategic discourse can be categorized into the following six types, each defining "China" in unique ways and stipulating specific conceptions.⁹⁴ The first type is the discourse that specifies how the policy should be interpreted. "One China" refers to the Republic of China. The second type is the discourse that removes the policy's political connotation. "One China" is about history, about culture, about geography, or about blood connection, but does not represent a political policy. Under such a conception, both China and Taiwan could be said to be part of "China." Third is the discourse that divides up time periods to interpret the policy. "One China" was a term used in both a past and a future, but never a present, tense. In 1912, the "past tense China" was established by the ROC. The "present tense China" is the divided China. Under common agreement, there is "one China, with each side doing its own interpretation" (*yige zhongguo, gezi biaoshu*, or 一個中國,各自表述), and the two sides defined as political entities equal in status, their relation eventually designated as "special state-to-state relations." Here we can see that both the PRC and the ROC are said to possess the quality of being *zhongguo* in their own right.

The fourth type of discourse includes both parties, and neither the PRC nor the ROC is equivalent to the totality of China. The fifth kind of discourse highlights mutual exclusiveness. In other words, both the PRC and the ROC are independent sovereignties and neither can represent the other. In the sixth

and final type of discourse, different names are used when handling matters internally and externally. When handling matters internally, both parties are political entities equal in status; when handling matters externally, ROC is able to claim its independent statehood.

This complex set of rhetorical strategies probably confuses rather than clarifies the meanings of *zhongguo*. However, this is exactly what the situation warrants: *zhongguo* is a polysemous term that can be understood, talked about, and defined and articulated in different ways in different sociopolitical situations. Similarly, President Chen's discursive strategy has usurped the ROC Constitution's implied One China Policy and undermined the legitimacy of the symbol *zhongguo*—he goes on to make the One China Policy a “discussion topic” (*yiti*, or 議題) rather than “a principle” (*yuanze*, or 原則). In line with Lee, Chen's discourse renders the term *zhongguo* in a continual state of uncertainty, subject to having its meanings contested in the future.⁹⁵

The fact that so many alternative interpretations are required to speculate about the meanings for the term *zhongguo* testifies to the enormous pressure the government has faced from China, from other countries, and from dissenting voices within Taiwan that either support or lean toward unification with China. Of course, most importantly, Taiwan must face itself as a political entity the majority of whose residents are of Chinese ethnic origin and yet struggle to find their own identity different from the Sinic world represented by the mainland. With such complex rhetoric, and with the Taiwanese government's continual invention of discourse to cope with pressure from the One China Policy, the meaning of *zhongguo* not only continues to become more complicated, but the Taiwanese identity also takes on different forms and contents in response to the changing conceptions of what *zhongguo* stands for.

Reconstituting Taiwanese Identity between Taiwanese-ness and Chinese-ness

Identities, as Laitin notes, “On the one hand...can mobilize thousands of adherents; on the other hand, these identities, when careful archeological work is done, are revealed as fabrications.”⁹⁶

Such “fabrications,” as in the case of *taiwan* and *zhongguo*, grow out of their unique sociohistorical contexts.

The identity project facing people in Taiwan, particularly in their struggle between Chinese-ness and Taiwanese-ness, espouses multiple layers of complexity. The Dutch, the Spaniards, and the Japanese were simply foreign nations that occupied Taiwan. The Nationalist Party (KMT), on the other hand, is at the same time a “foreign regime,” as former President Lee puts it, and of the same Chinese descent as the majority of people in Taiwan. This presents a particularly thorny case of primordial ties. While sharing the same ethnicity and assumed blood ties, their languages and social customs have nevertheless diverged over 300 years of separation. To establish the *zhongguo* identity, both groups need to deal not only with conflict between identification with primordial ties and commitment to a large, powerful polity, but also with conflict within identification with primordial ties. Moreover, as Mandarin Chinese has become the native language for more local residents, the primordial bases for both groups have been reconfigured.

Despite its corruption and harsh treatment of people during its early rulership, the Nationalist Government nevertheless inculcated people in Taiwan with an urge to return to a Chinese motherland. Many people in Taiwan—especially early Chinese immigrants—were frustrated at their inability to govern themselves, but have learned to be proud of their Chinese heritage. The conflict between a seemingly remote sense of sorrowfulness and being a proud Chinese characterizes the paradoxical tension expressed in negotiating meanings of *taiwan* and *zhongguo*. This paradox is further complicated by the role played by the PRC: to identify with *zhongguo*, it has to be a desirable object; however, China—the representative of *zhongguo*—poses a serious threat to Taiwan's security.⁹⁷ It is a ruptured relation whose edges are never smooth.

Since 1988, with Lee's continuing Taiwanization and localization that forced a small group of unificationists to form the “New Party,” the 1990s was a time of endless debates between Taiwan and China, as well as between advocates of independence and those favoring unification. Especially during elections, identification was always the key issue to be disputed,⁹⁸ challenging fundamental assumptions of Taiwanese about who they are. Ironically, regardless of whether Taiwanese identification is with the

Taiwanese, or with the Chinese, both lack past experience to serve as a guide. Taiwan has never been ruled by China,⁹⁹ nor has it ever claimed independence.¹⁰⁰

The long-held ideology that *zhongguoren* includes Taiwanese, Cantonese, Shangdongese, and so on, much as a language would include all its variants/dialects, has undergone much revision, since the term *taiwanren* has been elevated to rival *zhongguoren*. At the same time, the conception of *zhongguoren* has also been transformed from an early, idealistic image of Han people embracing the beauty of Chinese culture, to the image of people from the PRC.

Although people may differ in the extent to which they accept *taiwanren* as the all-inclusive label for people living in Taiwan, there is little doubt that *taiwanren* is gradually diverging from *zhongguoren*. Many studies have shown that over the years, people in Taiwan have increasingly switched their identities from *zhongguoren* to *taiwanren*.¹⁰¹ Hsu and Fan's analysis of the realignment of Taiwanese identity between 1989 and 1996 shows the convergence of different ethnic groups (especially late and early Chinese immigrants) toward Taiwanese identification (*taiwanren rentong*, or 台灣人認同) and away from Chinese identification (*zhongguoren rentong*, or 中國人認同), especially among younger people.¹⁰² Similar trends between 1991 and 2001 were reported in surveys conducted by *United Daily News*: there has been a shift in the number of people who identify themselves as "Taiwanese," from less than 20 percent to almost 50 percent, while self-identified "Chinese" have dropped from 30 percent to single digits.¹⁰³

This general trend, however, encapsulates complex ranges of finer distinctions. Chang and Wang's analysis of six waves of surveys conducted between 1994 and 2002 confirms the same general trend. Particularly noteworthy is dual identity—Taiwanese identification declined somewhat around 2000, while dual identification accelerated at the same time. By year 2002, almost 60 percent of respondents considered themselves as having dual identities. The trend is particularly evident among the younger generations born after 1953, toward convergence of Taiwanese and Chinese identifications.¹⁰⁴ How primordial ethnic identification varies along generational lines remains to be studied.¹⁰⁵

N. Wu's analysis of surveys between 1992 and 2000 shows the inner working of identifications. Around 1996, in light of China's missile threat, pragmatists, as the largest group, increased significantly. Taiwanese nationalists, the second largest group, also increased. Chinese nationalists, the smallest group, declined significantly. After 1996, the proportion of the three groups remained stable. However, according to Wu's 1998 and 2000 data, this stable trend actually conceals the fact that people switch among different identifications during the two-year period (with pragmatists the most stable group). Aside from their fluid and volatile identification, the fact that the largest group of Taiwan's population found no specific identification is also unique among countries in the world.¹⁰⁶

Moreover, although politicians often see Taiwanese identity as supporting independence, and Chinese identity as in support of unification, several researchers note that people's identities (Taiwanese/Chinese) and their positions about Taiwan's future (independence/unification/undecided) are actually two separate constructs and may not always be congruent, even though their correlations have been significant and consistent.¹⁰⁷

Despite the increasing strength of Taiwanese identification, the push and pull toward Chinese identification—or no identification, *as* identification—continues to be problematic, subject to emotional as well as practical considerations. Construction of Taiwanese identity is predicated upon the seeming fluidity of changing identifications, and negotiated between the split among subethnic identifications and China's claim to have owned Taiwan.¹⁰⁸ Also, this identification process is muddled by the interconnection between people in Taiwan and in China, at cultural, economic, and political levels; as Wang and Liu's survey shows, although over 80 percent endorse Taiwan-centered political identities, only a quarter see Taiwanese culture as different from Chinese culture.¹⁰⁹

Conclusion

Although not everyone agrees with the new positioning of *taiwan* and *zhongguo*, the fact that there should be such a debate to begin with testifies that the deconstruction process has already

begun. While in the past *zhongguo* and *zhongguoren* represented the norm, to be taken for granted on all occasions, in more turbulent times, the new ethos sets *taiwan* and *taiwanren* as norms, confirming their increasingly prominent position. This reversal of position allows the symbols *taiwan* and *taiwanren* to claim status as the “most natural” designators for people in Taiwan. The term *taiwan* departs from being included as part of *zhongguo* and sets out to chart its own territory. As Fairclough puts it, achieving a high degree of naturalization for a specific set of discourse practices in fact reflects a covert mechanism of domination.¹¹⁰ Their unmarkedness renders their traces invisible, and hence makes them all the more powerful.

Although the word *taiwan* has gradually claimed more discursive space, people in Taiwan must continue to struggle to search for the best words to define themselves. It may well be a language game, but it is also a construction process in which meanings of terms of address are constantly negotiated and perceptions, feelings, and emotions grow to cling to these terms. National identity is a process whose substantive target continues to change over time.¹¹¹ The waning and waxing of these contrasting and yet at times overlapping terms aptly summarize the Taiwanese struggle as they seek to construct their identities. How the younger generation will see themselves, interpreting their cultural and political histories given political instability in Taiwan and changing configuration of powerful players such as China, the United States, and Japan, remains to be seen.

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Notes

1. This is not to deny there are inhabitants of Taiwan who are not of Chinese descent. The island of Taiwan was initially inhabited by aboriginals who were supplanted by Chinese from the southern Chinese provinces of Fujian and Guangdong, primarily during the 14th through 17th centuries.

- By the 19th century, Chinese had become the majority of the island's population. J. Copper, *Taiwan: Nation-state or Province?* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999), p. 11.
2. S. Blum, "Naming Practices and the Power of Words in China," *Language in Society*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (1997), p. 358.
 3. For a discussion of symbols, see Sherry B. Ortner, "On Key Symbols," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 75, No. 5 (1973), pp. 1338–46.
 4. N. Fairclough, *Language and Power* (London: Longman, 1989). See also N. Fairclough, "Introduction," in Norman Fairclough (ed.), *Critical Language Analysis* (London: Longman, 1992), pp. 1–29.
 5. For more on changing Taiwanese cultures, see B.-y. Chang, "From Taiwanisation to De-Sinification: Cultural Construction in Taiwan since the 1990s," *China Perspectives*, Vol. 56 (2004), pp. 34–44; C.-m. Chao, "Will Economic Integration between Mainland China and Taiwan Lead to Congenial Political Culture?," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (2003), pp. 280–304; and W.-m. Tu, "Cultural Identity and the Politics of Recognition in Contemporary Taiwan," *China Quarterly*, Vol. 148 (1996), pp. 1115–40.
 6. D. Laitin, *Identity in Formation* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 11–13.
 7. Focusing on the period after the Nationalists' relocation to Taiwan in 1949 necessarily leaves out important prior influences under Japan and other rulers, rendering Taiwan's history in limited terms. Nevertheless, we have chosen to discuss events transpiring primarily from this critical moment forward, since it was at this time that the symbol *zhongguo* began to more concretely emerge as Taiwan's national symbol.
 8. For discussions of primordial ties, see C. Geertz, "Primordial and Civic Ties," in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds), *Nationalism* (Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 29–34; and E. Shils, "Primordial, Personal, Sacred, and Civil Ties," *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 8 (1957), pp. 130–45.
 9. N. Wu, "Romance and Bread: A Preliminary Study of the Identity Change in Taiwan [*mianbao yu aiqing: cutan taiwan minzhong minzu rentong de biandong*]," *Taiwan Political Science Review*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2005), pp. 6–9.
 10. Geertz, 1994, p. 30.
 11. W.-m. Tu, "Cultural China: The Peripheral as the Center," in Wei-ming Tu (ed.), *The Living Tree: The Changing Meaning of being Chinese Today* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), pp. 1–34.
 12. Laitin, 1998, pp. 21–24.
 13. A good example is D. Wu's discussion of Chinese identity. D. Y.-h. Wu, "The Construction of Chinese and Non-Chinese Identities," in Wei-ming Tu (ed.), *The Living Tree: The Changing Meaning of being Chinese Today* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), pp. 148–167.
 14. H.-w. Cho, *Taiwan's Application to GATT/WTO: Significance of Multilateralism for an Unrecognized State* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), pp. 1–2.
 15. G.-h. Dai, *Taiwan Complex and China Complex [taiwanjie yu zhongguojie]* (Taipei, Taiwan: Yuan-Liou Publishing Company, 1994).

16. T.-I. Chen, "De-Colonization vs. Re-Colonization: The Debate Over 'tairen nuhua' of 1946 in Taiwan," *Taiwan Historical Research*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2002 a), pp. 145–201.
17. This metaphor develops out of Z.-I. Wu's novel, *The Orphan of Asia*, originally written in Japanese in 1945. Z.-I. Wu, *The Orphan of Asia* [*yaxiya de guer*] (Taipei, Taiwan: Grass Roots Publishing Company, 1995).
18. S. Phillips, "Between Assimilation and Independence," in Murray A. Rubinstein (ed.), *Taiwan: A New History* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 276.
19. Kerr, and also Lai, Myers, and Wei, provide accounts on the massacre. G. Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965). T.-h. Lai, R. Myers, and W. Wei, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991).
20. H.-c. Chang, "'Taiwan,' 'ROC,' and 'the Other Side': A Rhetorical Analysis of President Chen Shui-bien's Construction of Taiwan Identity," Paper presented at the 10th International Conference of the International Association for Intercultural Communication Studies, Taipei, Taiwan, 2005.
21. J. Jacobs, "'Taiwanization' in Taiwan's Politics," in John Makeham and A-chin Hsiao (eds), *Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 18.
22. When did people in Taiwan manage to cultivate their national identity, given that the broader political milieu actively forbade a Taiwanese consciousness? T.-I. Chen (2002b) summarize three positions taken by scholars: (1) it took shape in the 1920s, when the Taiwanese fought against colonial Japan to gain self-governance; (2) it was incited after the February 28th Incident in 1947, when the killing of many Taiwanese shattered people's identification with an imagined China; (3) it began after the Formosa Event in the 1980s, when inequalities between different ethnic groups came to the forefront and protesters demanded the lifting of martial law to practice democracy. While we agree with T.-I. Chen's position that February 28th Incident was a critical point in cultivating Taiwanese consciousness, all these different time periods and political configurations contributed to the development of Taiwanese national identity. Tsui-lien Chen, "Current Status of Studies of Taiwanese National Identification [*taiwan de guojia rentong yanjiu jinkuang*]," *The Academia Historica Journal New Series*, Vol. 33 (2002b), pp. 3–6. Tu (1996) holds the view that Taiwanese consciousness emerged against Japanese assimilation policy as a cultural construct; a heightened consciousness of nativistic and subaltern identities was formed, however, under the Nationalist's hegemonic ideological control (pp. 1118–1119).
23. T.-I. Chen (2002a), pp. 148–153.
24. W.-m. Tu, "Cultural Identity and the Politics of Recognition in Contemporary Taiwan," *China Quarterly*, Vol. 148 (1996), p. 1123.
25. Geertz, 1994, p. 31.
26. This line of rhetoric continues to be exploited for specific political purposes even today; for example, some people criticize former President Lee and people of his generation as having been stigmatized as "Japanese"

- (T.-I. Chen, 2002a, p. 146), an act many would find antithetical to being “Chinese” (see Tu, 1996, p. 1123).
27. Tu, 1996, p. 1123.
 28. T.-I. Chen (2002b), p. 5.
 29. The term “communist bandits” and related expressions were used roughly from the 1950s to the 1980s, as can be seen in public discourse such as the *ROC Yearbook*, 1970–1985, and National Day speeches, 1949–1987. Hui-ching Chang, “Managing Identity by Naming ‘China’: An Analysis of the Taiwan Government’s Terms of Address for China,” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the National Communication Association, Chicago, 2004.
 30. Cho, 2002, pp. 114, 121.
 31. Tu, 1996, p. 1122.
 32. Cho, 2002, pp. 113, 135.
 33. For example, Ming-min Peng advocated “One China, One Taiwan” in the “Taiwan Self-Help Proclamation” (*taïwan zìjiù xuānyán*, or 台灣自救宣言) in 1964; Zhen Lei suggested that KMT build a separate Chinese Republic of Taiwan (*zhōnghuá taïwan mínzhúguó*, or 中華台灣民主國) in 1971; and in 1977, Jun-ming Gao also offered suggestions and made a “human rights announcement” to advocate the right of self-determination by the people of Taiwan. Yi-shen Chen, Hua-yuan Xue, Ming-jun Li and Qing-shan Hu, *History and Theory of Taiwan's National Position* [*taïwan guójia dìngwéi de lìshǐ yu lǐlùn*] (Taipei: Yushanshe, 2004), pp. 28–29, 32–34.
 34. D. Roy, *Taiwan: A Political History* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 90.
 35. Cho, 2002, pp. 130–131.
 36. Roy, 2003, p. 78.
 37. Cho, 2002, pp. 152–153.
 38. X.-f. Li, *Xiao-feng Li Column* [*lixiaofeng zhuanlan*] (Taipei: New Naturalism, Inc., 2004), p. 260.
 39. “Chinese Cultural College” changed its title to “Chinese Cultural University” in 1980, www.pccu.edu.tw/intro/intro.asp [accessed 10 Oct. 2005].
 40. L. Dittmer, “Taiwan Aim-Inhibited Quest for Identity and the China Factor,” *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, Vol. 40 (2005), p. 75.
 41. Several scholars have discussed language policies in Taiwan under KMT rule. For example, T.-I. Chen, 2002a, pp. 151–153; R. Cheng, “Language Unification in Taiwan: Present and Future,” in Murray A. Rubinstein (ed.), *The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 357–391; W.-r. Hong, *The Linguistic Crisis of Taiwan* [*taïwan yuyan weiji*] (Taipei: Qianwei Publishing Company, 1992); and A.-c. Hsiau, “Language Ideology in Taiwan: The KMT’s Language Policy, the Taiyu Language Movement, and Ethnic Politics,” *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (1997), pp. 302–315.
 42. T.-I. Chen, 2002 a, pp. 151–153.
 43. H. Giles and P. Johnson, “Ethnolinguistic Identity Theory: A Social Psychological Approach to Language Maintenance,” *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, Vol. 68 (1987), pp. 69–99.

44. Tu, 1996, p. 1124.
45. Geertz, 1994, p. 30.
46. T.Y. Wang and I-c. Liu, "Contending Identities in Taiwan: Implications for Cross-Strait Relations," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 44, No. 4 (2004), p. 573.
47. *Ibid.*, pp. 571–572.
48. S.-b. Lin, *Loudly Claim That You Love Taiwan* [*dasheng shuo chu ai taiwan*] (Taipei: Qianwei Publishing Company, 1989).
49. According to one website (www.taiwan-info.de/html/chinese/Mu_chien.htm), this song is the theme song for the Greenpeace radio station, and was composed and written by Wen-de Wang, a truck driver. We can also infer that the song was composed no later than the end of 1994 [accessed 17 Jan. 2005]. Also, the story of how the song became popular is quite touching. According to the host of the radio station, an old man called and said that he had written a song for Taiwan, which he sang. After the song was played, many people were moved and asked the radio station to play the song over and over again. The host asked the man to send him the melody, but he said that he did not know how to write it down. Hence, he sang and recorded the song, and then sent the tape to the station. The radio station then hired a professional musician to compose and produce the song. This story was related by the radio station announcer Nian-Zhen Wu, when he served as host for the 2005 Lunar New Year Celebration Party sponsored by the Vancouver Taiwanese Association on 12 January 2005 (H.-x. Chang, personal communication, 24 Jan. 2005). The song has also been sung by Zhen-nan Cai (Chang and Holt, 2006).
50. Early Chinese immigrants nicknamed Taiwan the "sweet potato" because of the island's shape. This image also stands in contrast to late Chinese immigrants who came to Taiwan in 1949 and were referred to as "taro." When Chen Shui-bien was elected President in 2000, he was called not only "Taiwan's son" (*taiwan zhi zi*, or 台灣之子) but also "the son of the Sweet Potato."
51. The lyrics are translated from the following website: icool.myweb.hinet.net/loveTaiwan.htm [accessed 17 Jan. 2005]. See H.-c. Chang and R. Holt, "The Repositioning of 'Taiwan' and 'China': An Analysis of Patriotic Songs of Taiwan," *Intercultural Communication Studies*, Vol. XV, No. 1 (2006), p. 101.
52. H.-c. Chang, "From "Orphan of Asia" to "Moses Coming out of Egypt": A Metaphorical Analysis of the Transformation of Taiwan's Political Identity," in Mary Jane Collier (ed.), *Transforming Communication about Culture: Critical New Directions* [International and Intercultural Communication Annual, Vol. XXIV] (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2001), p. 36.
53. Tu, 1996, p. 1118.
54. Cho, 2002, p. 130.
55. T.-l. Chen, 2002b, pp. 1–2.
56. Tu, 1996, p. 1119.
57. See Laitin, 1998, p. 11.

58. N. Wu, 2005, p. 6.
59. Chao, 2003, pp. 298–300, 303.
60. Tu, 1996, p. 1115.
61. “Taiwan province” is supposedly locally governed. However, since in reality the ROC is only in charge of Taiwan and other offshore islands, the Taiwan provincial government in fact overlaps with the ROC central government. Currently, Taiwan province is “frozen” (*dongsheng*) rather than abolished (*feisheng*). The word *dong* (to freeze) suggests a temporary condition, to be resolved when the time is right. Only at that time can “Taiwan Province”—said to be one among 35 provinces the ROC has controlled—be abolished (*fei*) and publicly acknowledged that Taiwan is no longer a province. Such language games, because they permit officials to walk a tightrope by not publicly announcing Taiwan’s independence, nevertheless hint at their intentions.
62. L. Ling and C.-y. Shih, “Confucianism with a Liberal Face: The Meaning of Democratic Politics in Postcolonial Taiwan,” *Review of Politics*, Vol. 60, No. 1 (1998), pp. 75–77.
63. “Pan-green” is a label for members of the DPP and the TSU (Taiwan Solidarity Union), both of which advocate Taiwan’s independent identity as separate, or at least different, from the PRC. The opposing side is labeled “pan-blue” and applies to supporters of the KMT and the PFP (People’s First Party), both of which are opposed to Taiwan’s political independence.
64. Q. Li, *Taiwan, My Mother* [*taiwan, wode muqin*] (Taipei: Grass Root Publishing House, 1999).
65. Y.-x. Lin, “Taiwan, My Mother, Please Listen to the Prayer of Taiwanese” [*taiwan, wode muqin, qingting taiwanren qidao*], *Taiwan Daily* (20 March 2004), retrieved from www.linyhome.com/index104.htm [accessed 16 Jan. 2005].
66. S.-b. Chen, “Victory Speech After the 10th Republic of China Presidential and Vice Presidential Election” (ROC Presidential Office, 18 March 2000), www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/docset/listC.php4?_section=4 [accessed 10 Feb. 2005].
67. S. Hayden, “Family Metaphors and the Nation: Promoting a Politics of Care through the Million Mom March,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, Vol. 89, No. 3 (2003), pp. 205–208.
68. *ROC Yearbook 2002* [*zhonghuaminguo nianjian jiushiyi nian ban*] (Government Information Office, 2002), www.gio.gov.tw/info/91roc/contents/main.htm [accessed 8 Feb. 2004]; *Taiwan Yearbook 2003* (Government Information Office, 2003), www.roc-taiwan.org.au/taiwan/5-gp/yearbook/ (especially chapter 6, www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/chpt06.htm) [accessed 15 Jan. 2004]; *Taiwan Yearbook 2004* (Government Information Office, 2004), www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/index.htm [accessed 9 Jan. 2005]; and *Taiwan Yearbook 2005* (Government Information Office, 2005), www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/ [accessed 11 Jan. 2006].

69. S.-b. Chen, "Help Taiwan Fight SARS," *Washington Post* (9 May 2003a), retrieved from www.taiwandc.org/wp-2003-03.htm [accessed 8 Jan. 2005].
70. S.-b. Chen, "President Chen's New Year Message" (ROC Presidential Office, 1 Jan. 2006), www.president.gov.tw/php-bin/docset/showspeak.php4 [accessed 26 Jan. 2006].
71. In the Taiwanese dialect, the pronoun *yi* (he, she, or it) has no gender designation. We use "she" here because it refers to a flower; flowers are considered feminine in Taiwanese culture.
72. See Y.-p. Chang, "Two Million Rally for Peace," *Taipei Times* (29 Feb. 2004), www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2004/02/29/2003100533 [accessed 20 Jan. 2005]; and Y.-p. Chang, "228 Human Chain Rally Commemorated in Book, VCD," *Taipei Times* (19 May 2004), www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2004/05/19/2003156088 [accessed 20 Jan. 2005].
73. Y.-p. Chang, "Shen to DPP: Stop Harping on Ethnic Issues," *Taipei Times* (17 April 2004b), www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2004/04/17/2003137000 [accessed 16 Jan. 2005].
74. Laitin, 1998, p. 18.
75. Chao, 2003, p. 284.
76. The construction of Chinese as embracing Han and other peoples has another history (see N. Wu, 2005, pp. 12–13).
77. Tu, 1996, p. 1122.
78. Wang and Liu, 2004, pp. 574–578.
79. The DPP government's proposal received severe criticism from supporters of unification. D. Wu, "Parties Argue over History Education," *Taipei Times* (11 Nov. 2004), www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2004/11/11/2003210570 [accessed 12 Dec. 2004].
80. Because of its rejection of the term *zhongguo* and its goal of being more inclined to Taiwan's independence, DPP has also been reluctant to call Taiwan "the Republic of China." However, the controversial presidential election of 2004 seems to have changed DPP's position: at least at its May 20 inaugural, supporters not only chanted "the Republic of China," they also waved flags. Such gestures are intended to bridge the gap between DPP and KMT supporters, bringing the two opposing parties toward the middle.
81. For a good analysis of the unification–independence debate, see Y.-c. Chuang, "Taiwanese Identity in a Global/Local Context: The Use and Abuse of National Consciousness in Taiwan," in Christian Aspalter (ed.), *Understanding Modern Taiwan: Essays in Economics, Politics and Social Policy* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2001), pp. 53–66.
82. T.-l. Huang, "KMT is Split on 'Chinese' in its Name," *Taipei Times* (16 May 2004), www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2004/05/16/2003155683 [accessed 12 Feb. 2005].
83. De-Sinicization is directed not just at the PRC's China, but also at the ROC's China. Since the question of how the symbol *taiwan* is used to replace or supplement the symbol "Republic of China" requires more extensive analysis, it is not addressed in this paper.

84. Chen, Xue, Li, and Hu, 2004, p. 45.
85. The DPP government has also asked that overseas missions change their names to include *taiwan*. These missions, under pressure from China, assumed a variety of names, though none include Taiwan's official title, "Republic of China."
86. The military slogan in the past was "Abiding by President [Chiang's] dying wish, following the leadership of the government, exterminating all evil communist bandits, and rescuing mainland fellows" (奉行領袖遺志、服從政府領導、消滅萬惡共匪、解救大陸同胞). Two additional phrases were added on important ceremonial occasions: "Long live the Three Principles of People!" (三民主義萬歲) and "Long lived the Republic of China!" (中華民國萬歲). During the term of former President Lee, it was changed to "Abiding by the Three Principles of People, following the leadership of the government, protecting national security, and accomplishing the great task of unification" (奉行三民主義、服從政府領導、保衛國家安全、完成統一大業). Now it is said that the slogan should be revised to the following: "Abiding by democracy and freedom, following the leadership of the government, protecting Taiwan's security, and being loyal to people in Taiwan" (奉行民主自由、服從政府領導、保衛台灣安全、效忠台灣人民). M.-k. Zhang, "DPP Legislators Ask ROC Military to Re-examine Their Slogans to Align with Taiwan's Rectification of Names," *Central News Agency* (3 Sept. 2003), 210.69.89.224/search/hypage.cgi# [accessed 10 Jan. 2006].
87. Y.-t. Chen and H.-y. Shen, "Legislators Request Rectification of Slogans on Assignment Books," *Liberty Times* (4 Feb. 2005), www.libertytimes.com.tw/2005/new/feb/5/today-p3.htm [accessed 10 Oct. 2005].
88. Laitin, 1998, p. 13.
89. For a history of the One China policy, see Chao (2003), pp. 286–304.
90. *Ibid.*, p. 291.
91. M. Yahuda, "The International Standing of the Republic of China on Taiwan," *China Quarterly*, Vol. 148 (1996), p. 1320.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 1329.
93. *Documentary Collection on One China Discourse*, Vol. 1 (Taipei, Taiwan: Academia Historica, 2000), pp. 6–7.
94. *Ibid.*, pp. 7–8.
95. Since it is a "discussion topic," as Chen's 2000 inaugural speech states, Taiwan is willing to discuss this matter with China. Such seeming word play may in fact create the space needed to open discussion on the stalled political agenda concerning the One China policy (*Ibid.*). Later, as C.-y. Lin observes, eventually, in Chen's speech for the Double Tenth Celebration of the 92nd anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China, he called for China to abandon the One China ideology. Chieh-yu Lin, "Chen Tells Beijing to Ditch 'one China,'" *Taipei Times* (11 Oct. 2003), www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2003/10/11/2003071243 [accessed 20 Jan. 2005]
96. Laitin, 1998, p. 19.
97. Dittmer, 2005, p. 76.

98. T.-I. Chen, 2002b, p. 1.
99. Taiwan was included as a territory of the Qing Dynasty. After the Sino-Japanese war, Taiwan was ceded to Japan until 1945 when the Nationalists took over Taiwan and established ROC there. Since the PRC was established in 1949 in China and prior to that time Taiwan was ruled by Japan, Taiwan has never been ruled by the PRC.
100. Y.-m. Hsu and Y. Fan, "Learning to be Taiwanese: Trails of Change of Political Learning and Taiwanese Identification, 1986–1996," *Journal of Taiwan Politics*, Vol. 5 (2001), p. 6.
101. G. A. Chang and T.Y. Wang, "Taiwanese or Chinese? Independence or Unification? An Analysis of Generational Differences in Taiwan," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 1–2 (2005), pp. 29–49. See also, among others, Dittmer, 2005; Hsu and Fan, 2001; and Wang and Liu, 2001.
102. More specifically, before 1992, early Chinese immigrants from Fukien province were prone to identify themselves as Chinese, but then shifted to Taiwanese in 1992 and continued with that name until at least 1996. The difference between Fukien and late Chinese immigrants therefore moves from original similar identification to divergence in 1992, then toward slight convergence in 1996. As for the Hakka, their identification is similar to that of the Fukien (Hsu and Fan, 2001).
103. Chao, 2003, p. 289. Chao also reported a 2001 survey by National Chengchi University Election Studies Center which shows that 47% of Fukien identify themselves as "Taiwanese, not Chinese," whereas only 15.6% of late Chinese immigrants do. As for the category "Chinese," 26.6% of late Chinese immigrants so identified themselves, while only 6.5% of Fukien did (*ibid.*, p. 297). As time passes, however, the distinction in identification issues between late and early Chinese immigrants has become less significant (Wang and Liu, 2004, p. 578).
104. Chang and Wang, 2005, pp. 35–39.
105. L. Dittmer, "Taiwan and the Issue of National Identity," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 44, No. 4 (2004), p. 483.
106. N. Wu, 2005, pp. 15–21.
107. Dittmer, 2004; Wang and Liu, 2004.
108. Dittmer, 2005, p. 72.
109. Wang and Liu, 2004, p. 575.
110. Fairclough, 1992.
111. Dittmer, 2005, p. 75.

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